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The Role of Religious Values in
Judicial Decision Making
SCOTT C. IDLEMAN*
[U]nless people believe in the law, unless they attach a universal and
ultimate meaning to it, unless they see it and judge it in terms of a
transcendent truth, nothing will happen. The law will not work-it will
be dead.'
INTRODUCTION
It is virtually axiomatic today that judges should not advert to religious
values when deciding cases,2 unless those cases explicitly involve
religion.' In part because of historical and constitutional concerns and in
* J.DJM.P.A. Candidate, 1993, Indiana University School of Law at Bloomington; B.S., 1989,
Cornell University.
1. HAROLD J. BERMAN, THE INTERACTION OF LAW AND RELIGION 74 (1974).
2. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 239 (1988);
Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 932, 932 (1989);
Thomburgh v. Amencan College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 778 (1986) (Stevens,
J., concurring) (asserting, in the context of abortion, that the argument that life begins at conception is
a religious or theological argument and that the Court's jurisdiction is limited to evaluating secular
interests); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 658 (N.J. 1976) (noting that "it is not usual for matters of
religious dogma or concepts to enter a civil litigation (except as they may bear upon constitutional right
[sic], or sometimes, familial matters)") (citation omitted), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); City of
Milwaukee v. Wilson, No. 77-670 (Wis. CL App. Jan. 19, 1979) (LEXIS, States library, Wisc file),
aff'd, 291 N.W.2d 452 (Wis. 1980).
[T]his is a court of law. It is not within our province to pass upon theological questions,
but only to determine the law as applicable to the case before the court. While the law
may have had parts of its origin in the same customs and necessities as did traditional
religion, it is a distinct entity from religion, functioning in a different manner and being
guided by different principles.
Id.
Indeed, a pure "legal reasoning" model of judicial decision making would hold that legal reasoning
alone should "provide a basis for decision making in particular cases that is separate from politics, social
theory, or particular values. Decisions are made on a legal basis rather than on the basis of social,
political, moral, or religious perspectives." David Kairys, Law and Politics, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
243, 243 (1984) (emphasis in original).
3. Cases explicitly involving religion include disputes within or between religious entities, child
custody cases (where the parents' religious beliefs bear on the issue of custody), cases involving alleged
discrimination on the basis of religion or by an allegedly religious institution, taxation cases examining
whether the entity seeking tax-exemption or some other tax preference is statutorily "religious," and,
of course, cases arising under the religion clauses of the First Amendment to the Constitution (or under
analogous clauses within state constitutions).
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part because of assumptions about the nature of religious knowledge itself,
religion is frequently perceived as an inappropriate source of values in the
policy-making or law-making process, including adjudication.4 This Note
refutes that position and explains why certain religious values can and
even should enter into the judicial decision-making process.
Part I begins with a discussion of what constitutes a "religious" value
and then evaluates five explanations of why religious values might be
perceived as illegitimate sources in the law-making process. Part II, in
turn, sets forth a number of reasons-from the four perspectives of
history, political philosophy, social utility, and the reality of judicial
decision making-why religion can or should be included in a judge's
resolution of cases. Finally, Part III delineates certain prudential and
constitutional limits on the use of religious values in judicial decision
making.
Because this Note develops its thesis largely in the abstract, a number
of qualifications should be noted from the outset. First, when discussing
judicial reliance on religious values, this Note has in mind not only the
religious values or beliefs of the presiding judge, but also the religious
values of the parties at hand or of society generally, including the
teachings of formal religious organizations. Second, the term "religious
values" (examined more closely in Part I) should be construed broadly to
include not only values as such, but also religious teachings, claims, and
underlying beliefs. Third, when speaking of "judicial decision making,"
this Note primarily addresses the judicial resolution of questions of law,
although the judicial use of religious values may have implications for
other functions such as fact-finding or the formation of remedies. Finally,
this Note does not necessarily envision an explicit role for religious
values in the vast majority of legal controversies; rather, the focus is on
ethically difficult cases, or other so-called "hard cases,"5 where judicial
4. This Note will not directly discuss the role of religious values in the decision making of
legislative or executive officers. For a discussion of religious values in legislative decision making, see
GREENAWALT, supra note 2. It is probably the case, however, that the use of religious values by these
other lawmakers also meets with general disapproval, at least among certain commentators. See, e.g.,
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 211 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("That certain religious
groups condemn [homosexual sodomy] gives the State no license to impose the judgments on the entire
citizenry. The legitimacy of secular legislation depends instead on whether the State can advance some
justification for its law beyond its conformity to religious doctrine."); Edward B. Foley, .Tillich and
Camus, Talking Politics, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 954 (1992) (reviewing MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND
POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1991)).
5. For one approach to categorically separating "hard cases" from "easy cases," see David Lyons,
Justification andJudicial Responsibility, 72 CAL. L. REv. 178, 179-83 (1984). Of course, the convenient
bifurcation of litigation into easy and hard cases is not without its critics. See, e.g., Lois G. Forer, The
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reference to religious values, among others, may be particularly
appropriate, helpful, and even necessary Hard cases might present issues
such as when human life begins or ends, what constitutes a human life,
how humans should treat the environment or other species, or how scarce
resources should be distributed within the human community Like many
problems confronting the courts, all of these issues require ultimate moral
determinations about the nature of human beings or about the nature of
their relationship to one another, to the state, and to the global
community 6
I. EXAMINING THE NATURE OF RELIGIOUS VALUES
AND THEIR APPARENT EXCLUSION FROM
THE AMERICAN LAW-MAKING PROCESS
A. What Makes a Value or Claim "Religious"?
However theoretical this Note's thesis may be; it can hardly be
developed without some level of shared understanding concerning the
ideas involved and the various alternative consequences at stake.
Generally speaking, the broader one's definition of "religious," or the
more liberal one's conception of religiousness, the more significant the
notion of excluding religious values from judicial decision making
becomes. At the outset, therefore, it is necessary to ask why any particular
Role of Conscience in Judicial Decision-Making, in THE WEIGHTIER MATTERS OF THE LAW: ESSAYS
ON LAW AND RELIGION 285, 290 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 1988).
6. A contemporary legal and moral issue in which the judicial use of religious values could play
a role is the proposed removal of organs from anencephalic infants. Many people became aware of this
issue when the "Baby Theresa" controversy arose in Florida in the spring of 1992. Following an in utero
diagnosis of Theresa Ann Campo Pearson's anencephalic condition, her parents decided to carry her to
term and then "donate" her otherwise healthy organs. Because her brain stem was functioning
postnatally, however, the infant was not legally dead under a state law defining death as the irreversible
cessation of brain activity. See FLA. STAT. ch. 382.009(1) (1991). The trial court "resolved" the dispute
by deferring to this statutory definition of death and, accordingly, by ruling against any organ removal
which would cause harm to the infant. Following a summary affirmance by the Fourth District Court
of Appeal, the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed the trial court's judgment, although it did so based
on a common law definition of death as the irreversible cessation of circulatory and respiratory
functions. See In re T.A.C.P., No. 79-582,1992 WL 324714 (Fla. Nov. 12, 1992). Ultimately, this legal-
ethical dilemma will require a court or legislature to decide, among other things, what are the parameters
of human life, what are the nature and weight of the infant's, the parents', and the larger community's
interests, and which legal institution, if any, should oversee such controversies. Other than the
institutional question, it is precisely in such an analysis that religious values-to the extent that certain
religions have traditionally addressed such questions of human meaning and continue to do so, and to
the extent that these religious values reflect or incorporate values embraced by many community
members--can or should readily play a role.
1993]
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value or claim should be considered "religious" at all and to attempt to
define where the edges of that concept might lie.7
Most people would probably agree that when formally recognized
religious organizations make theologically-based claims about public
policy, then these claims or their underlying values should be considered
religious in nature.8 A determination of religiousness cannot ultimately
rest with the identity of the speaker, however, since religious
organizations or individuals clearly make claims and engage in speech
which would not be considered religious by any measure9 and since, more
7. This Note's inquiry is generally not concerned with finding a legal definition of religion per
se, a task usually and frequently undertaken in the First Amendment context. As a result, the inquiry
here is not particularly bounded by (or plagued with) the legal concerns which lead most First
Amendment commentators to develop definitions based on some strained admixture of theology, history,
political philosophy, and judicial precedent. For a sampling of such attempts, for better and for worse,
see LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-6 (2d ed. 1988); Andrew W. Austin,
Faith and the Constitutional Definition of Religion, 22 CUMB. L. REV. 1 (1991); A. Stephen Boyan, Jr.,
Defining Religion in Operational and Institutional Terms, 116 U. PA. L. REv. 479 (1968); Jesse H.
Choper, Defining "Religion" in the First Amendment, 1982 U. ILL. L. REv. 579; George C. Freeman,
III, The Misguided Search for the Constitutional Definition of "Religion, " 71 GEO. L.J. 1519 (1983);
Kent Greenawalt, Religion as a Concept in Constitutional Law, 72 CAL. L. REv. 753 (1984); Stanley
Ingber, Religion or Ideology: A Needed Clarification of the Religion Clauses, 41 STAN. L. REv. 233
(1989); Milton R. Konvitz, The Problem of a Constitutional Definition of Religion, in RELIGION AND
THE STATE 147 (James E. Wood, Jr. ed., 1985); Gail Merel, The Protection of Individual Choice: A
Consistent Understanding of Religion Under the First Amendment, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 805 (1978);
Sharon L. Worthing, "Religion" and "Religious Institutions" Under the First Amendment, 7 PEPP. L.
REv. 313 (1980); M. Elisabeth Bergeron, Note, "New Age" or New Testament?: Toward a More
Faithful Interpretation of "Religion, " 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 365 (1991); Ben Clements, Note,Defining
"Religion" in the First Amendment: A Functional Approach, 74 CORNELL L. REv. 532 (1989); Steven
D. Collier, Comment, Beyond Seeger/Welsh: Redefining Religion Under the Constitution, 31 EMORY
L.J. 973 (1982); Timothy L. Hall, Note, The Sacred and the Profane: A First Amendment Definition of
Religion, 61 TEX. L. REv. 139 (1982); Yehudah Mirsky, Note, Civil Religion and the Establishment
Clause, 95 YALE L.J. 1237 (1986); David Young, Comment, The Meaning of "Religion" in the First
Amendment: Lexicography and Constitutional Policy, 56 UMKC L. REV. 313 (1988); Note, Toward a
Constitutional Definition of Religion, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1056 (1978) [hereinafter Note, Definition of
Religion).
8. Examples might include NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ECONOMIC JUSTICE
FOR ALL. PASTORAL LETTER ON CATHOLIC SOCIAL TEACHING AND THE U.S. ECONOMY (1986), or
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES OF CHRIST, THE PLUTONIUM ECONOMY: A STATEMENT OF CONCERN
(1975). It does not necessarily follow that such claims or values must be considered religious, especially
if one takes seriously this Note's position that deeming something religious or nonreligious should not
simply be a public opinion-based or tradition-based descriptive undertaking. As a practical matter,
however, one's definition of religion or religious would have to be extremely limited, highly
unorthodox, and/or probably unworkable if it considered the above claims or values to be nonreligious.
9. From a subjective vantage point, of course, many persons or institutions may believe that every
aspect of their existence is to some degree religious, such that it would not be possible for them to make
nonreligious claims or engage in nonreligious speech. See, e.g., Dean B. Suagee, American Indian
Religious Freedom and Cultural Resources Management: Protecting Mother Earth's Caretakers, 10 AM.
INDIAN L. REv. 1 (1982) ("Tribal religions tend to see all life in religious terms, rather than divided into
domains clearly religious or nonreligous."). This Note tends toward a more objective perspective, in part
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significantly, this approach simply begs the question.' 0 That which is
"religious," moreover, cannot be defined solely by resort to a laundry list
of characteristics such as theistic belief, the use of ritual, the use of
sacred texts, the concept of prayer or meditation, or the expectation of
revelation." A laundry list approach may function quite well at labeling
those beliefs or values which resemble the one or more religious traditions
from which the list was constructed, but inherent in this approach are both
a substantial risk of bias 2 (or "religious chauvinism") 3 and, once
again, a strong tendency simply to beg the question.'
4
Although no approach is without its flaws (and thus its critics), it is
nevertheless possible to construct definitional schemes which are better
or worse than others according to various extrinsic criteria, such as
flexibility, inclusiveness, or some measure of operative utility (predictive,
taxonomic, or heuristic value). One arguably better approach, based
heavily on the criteria of inclusiveness and heuristic value, would be to
conceive of religiousness in terms of the degree of subjective ultimacy
arising from the meaning or purpose of one's assertion-that is, in terms
of the actual significance of certain types of claims to the life of the
claimant. The late theologian Paul Tillich, for example, described
religious faith or one's relationship to God as the source of one's
because law making typically requires some minimal level of objectivity (and since this Note is
precisely about judicial law making) and in part because the subjective vantage point may be largely
irrelevant to most persons confronted with the question of whether or not judges can advert to religious
values when deciding cases.
10. Under an identity-of-the-speaker approach, a value would be identifiably "religious" if it is
uttered by a person or institution which is "religious." But this begs the question, since one must then
explain what makes any particular person or institution "religious."
1I. To be sure, various religious traditions may possess all or only a few of these characteristics,
and various nonreligious traditions may possess some as well. Buddhism and Taoism, for example, are
considered nontheistic religions. See WING-TSIT CHAN ET AL., THE GREAT ASIAN RELIGIONS: AN
ANTHOLOGY 71, 150 (1969). Native African religion and most Native American religions, in contrast,
are theistic but involve no scriptures or holy books and rely largely on oral tradition. See JOHN S. MBi,
INTRODUCTION TO AFRICAN RELIGION 15 (1975); RICHARD C. BUSH ET AL., THE RELIGIOUS WORLD:
COMMUNmES OF FAITH 13 (Robert F Weir ed., 1982). And ritual is certainly part of many nonreligious
institutions including freemasonry, academia, the military, collegiate fraternities and sororities, and
numerous others. In short, a checklist approach to separating the religious from the nonreligious is
marginally useful at best and, in addition to running a risk of being Christian- or Westem-centric, can
be highly misleading as well.
12. THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE INVISIBLE RELIGION 41-42 (1967) ("Under the impression of a
particular historical form of religion a misleadingly general definition of religion emerged. The
definition prejudges the phenomenon in a manner which is best described as "narrowly 'ethnocentric.").
13. Note, Definition of Religion, supra note 7, at 1069-70 & n.84.
14. Under this approach, a value or belief would be identifiably "religious" if it resembles a value
or belief embraced by a tradition which has already been deemed religious-again requiring that one
further explain what makes the baseline tradition (or its values or beliefs) "religious."
1993]
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"4ultimate concern," such that "[t]he object of theology is what concerns
us ultimately " According to Tillich:
The religious concern is ultimate; it excludes all other concerns from
ultimate significance; it makes them preliminary The ultimate concern
is unconditional, independent of any conditions of character, desire, or
circumstance. The unconditional concern is total: no part of ourselves
or of our world is excluded from it; there is no "place" to flee from
it.1
6
In turn, world views which solicit, or which in fact become, the ultimate
concern of their adherents-such as those making normatively fundamental
claims about the human species-can then be viewed as religious, or at
least as making religious claims." Such claims, addressing the so-called
15. 1 PAUL TiLLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 12 (1951) [hereinafter I TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC
THEOLOGY]; see also GEORGE F THOMAS, PHILOSOPHY AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF 44-47, 207-10 (1970)
(summarizing and discussing Tillich's concept of ultimate concern); PAUL TILLICH, DYNAMICS OF FAITH
1-4 (1957) [hereinafter TILLICH, DYNAMICS OF FAITH]; PAUL TILLICH, THEOLOGY OF CULTURE 7-8
(Robert C. Kimball ed., 1959) ("Religion, in the largest and most basic sense of the word, is ultimate
concern."); cf LUCKMANN, supra note 12, at 69-73; ANTHONY O'HEAR, EXPERIENCE, EXPLANATION
AND FAITH: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION 2-3 (1984) ("Although it is probably
fruitless to search for any definition of religion in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions relating
to either beliefs or practice, all religions can in one way or another be seen as providing a framework
of meaningfulness for the lives and thought of their adherents and as making personal demands on
them."). For a general summary and discussion of Tillich's theology, see JAMES L. ADAMS, PAUL
TILLICH'S PHILOSOPHY OF CULTURE, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION 17-61 (Schocken Books 1970) (1965).
16. 1 TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY, supra note 15, at 11-12 (footnote omitted). Apparently,
Tillich intended the notion of "ultimate concern" to embrace both the subject's state of mind and the
object to which that state of mind is unconditionally devoted or oriented. See TILLICH, DYNAMICS OF
FAITH, supra note 15, at I (" The ultimate of the act of faith and the ultimate that is meant in the act
of faith are one and the same.").
17. RELIGION: NORTH AMERICAN STYLE 6-7 (Patrick H. McNamara ed., 2d ed. 1984) ("[Vliews
involv[ing] some kind of reflection upon 'ultimate' human purposes can be regarded as religious
in this broad, overarching sense.'); Collier, supra note 7, at 999 n.122. Third Circuit Court of Appeals
Judge Arlin Adams, one of the more thoughtful judicial commentators on the issue of defining religion,
has noted:
Traditional religions consider and attempt to come to terms with what could best be
described as "ultimate" questions--questions having to do with, among other things, life
and death, right and wrong, and good and evil. Not every tenet of an established theology
need focus upon such elemental matters, of course; still, it is difficult to conceive of a
religion that does not address these larger concerns. For, above all else, religions are
charactenzed by their adherence to and promotion of certain "underlying theories of
man's nature or his place in the Universe."
Africa v. Pennsylvania, 662 F.2d 1025, 1033 (3d Cir. 1981) (quoting Founding Church of Scientology
v. United States, 409 F.2d 1146, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 963 (1969)), cert. denied,
456 U.S. 908 (1982).
Under a traditional scheme of classifying approaches to defining religion (or distinguishing the
religious from the nonreligious), this Note's "ultimate concern" approach is something of a hybrid. On
the one hand, it can be considered a "functional" approach, since it examines the actual function of a
claim or value within the life of the adherent. On the other hand, because it takes into account the nature
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RELIGIOUS VALUES
"big questions," would include assertions about the meaning and purpose
of human existence or ultimate statements about the nature of human
beings."S Secular humanism, 9 for instance, may not be a religion as
such,2" but when it makes claims about the meaning of human existence,
of the claim or value-by examining whether or not the claim or value addresses ultimate questions of
human existence-it may also be considered a "substantive" approach, looking to the actual substance
or content of the claim or value in question. For a discussion of the functional and substantive
approaches, see Smith v. Board of Sch. Comm'rs, 655 F. Supp. 939, 967 (S.D. Ala. 1987), rev'd, 827
F.2d 684 (1 1th Cir. 1987); LuCKMANN, supra note 12, at 41-42.
18. John H. Mansfield, Conscientious Objection-1964 Term, in 1965 RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC
ODER 3, 10 (Donald A. Gianella ed., 1966) (addressing the approach in the context of conscientious
objectors); Paul Tillich, The Lost Dimension of Religion, in THE ESSENTIAL TILLICH (F. Forrester
Church ed., 1987):
Being religious means asking passionately the question of the meaning of our existence and
being willing to receive answers, even if the answers hurt. Such an idea of religion makes
religion universally human, but it certainly differs from what is usually called religion. It does
not describe religion as the belief in the existence of gods or one God, and as a set of activities
and institutions for the sake of relating oneself to these beings in thought, devotion and
obedience. No one can deny that the religions which have appeared in history are religions in
this sense. Nevertheless, religion in its innermost sense is more than religion in this narrower
sense. It is the state of being ultimately concerned about one's own being and being
universally.
Id. at 1. Because such assertions or questions also fall under a number of other categories, including
natural law and ethics, some persons might be tempted simply to reject or ignore the possibility that they
may be religious. To say, however, that a claim is not religious simply because it is "merely"
metaphysical, ethical, or the product of natural law reasoning is to skirt the issue entirely. The Roman
Catholic Church also makes natural law/ethical claims, and yet one would hesitate to take those out of
the realm of "religious" simply because they fall under other categories. See RELIGION: NORTH
AMERICAN STYLE, supra note 17, at 7.
19. "Secular humanism" can be defined as a belief in the principles of free inquiry, separation of
church and state, the ideal of freedom, ethics based on critical intelligence, moral education, religious
skepticism, reason, science and technology, evolution, and education. See Paul Kurtz, A Secular
Humanist Declaration, in ON THE BARRICADES: RELIGION AND FREE INQUIRY IN CONFLICT 13-20
(Robert Basil et al. eds., 1989) [hereinafter ON THE BARRICADES]. For a more thorough description of
secular humanism, see CORLIss LAMONT, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HUMANISM (1982) (including the
Humanist Manifesto I (1933), reprinted at pages 285-89, and the Humanist Manifesto 11 (1973), reprinted
at pages 296-300).
20. This Note will specifically avoid the larger question (and the related legal implications) of
whether or not secular humanism is truly a religion. For a discussion of that question, see Paul H.
Beattie, The Religion of Secular Humanism, in ON THE BARRICADES, supra note 19, at 34; John W.
Whitehead & John Conlan, The Establishment of the Religion of Secular Humanism and Its First
Amendment Implications, 10 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 1 (1978); Craig A. Mason, Comment, "Secular
Humanism " and the Definition of Religion: Extending a Modified "Ultimate Concern" Test to Mozert
v. Hawkins County Public Schools and Smith v. Board of School Commissioners, 63 WASH. L. REV.
445 (1988); Robert R. Melnick, Commentary, Secularism in the Law: The Religion of Secular
Humanism, 8 OHIO N.U. L. REv. 329 (1981); Julie A. Scheib, Note, Secular Humanism as a Religion
Within the Meaning of the First Amendment: Grove v. Mead School District, 61 TUL. L. REV. 453
(1986); Peter D. Schmid, Comment, Religion, Secular Humanism and the First Amendment, 13 S. ILL.
U. LJ. 357 (1989); see also Mozert v. Hawkins County Pub. Schs., 647 F Supp. 1194 (E.D. Tenn.
1986) (holding that requiring schoolchildren to read from textbooks they found offensive to their
religious beliefs burdened their free exercise of religion), rev'dsub nom. Mozert v. Hawkins County Bd.
1993]
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then under this approach it would be making religious claims. And while
such an inclusive approach may not be appropriate in all legal
contexts-First Amendment jurisprudence possibly being one such
context2 --it finds ample theological and religious philosophical
support; 22 it would seem, at least comparatively, to most reduce the
inherent risk of Western-centricism or "religious chauvinism";23 and, to
the extent that it is relevant, this approach has already been recognized
and employed by a number of courts, typically in the free exercise
context. 24 Because such an inclusive definition of religious values may
of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1066 (1988); Smith v. Board of Sch.
Comm'rs of Mobile County, 655 F Supp. 939 (S.D. Ala. 1987), rev'd, 827 F.2d 684 (11th Cir. 1987).
21. See, e.g., Ingber, supra note 7, at 285-86. But see infra notes 90-95 and accompanying text
(questioning whether "religion" under the First Amendment should be broadly or narrowly construed,
especially as between the two religion clauses).
22. Precisely because there is no widely accepted approach to defining religion (or to distinguishing
the religious from the nonreligious), the most that one can hope for is that a plurality of relevant
commentators accepts one's particular approach, Of course, the "ultimate concern" approach has hardly
gone uncriticized, and one of the easiest criticisms is the assertion that not all persons have ultimate
concerns or that persons may have a number of ultimate concerns at once. See, e.g., Freeman, supra note
7, at 1536-37; Greenawalt, supra note 7, at 808. This criticism arguably results from unduly
underemphasizing the notion of ultimacy (although it is only fair to point out that these authors were
speaking in the limited context of the First Amendment). It may be true that some persons are
consciously unable to rank their putative ultimate concerns, but when push comes to shove-when those
concerns are in tension, for example-one can be certain that there will emerge some even more
ultimate concern (whether or not from within that pool) which will dominate or mediate among these
competing concerns. Even if that meta-factor turns out to be nothing more than self-gratification, this
hardly indicates that no ultimate concern exists; to the contrary, it simply means that one's religion is
a cult of self. And while one might recoil at the prospect of granting solipsism protection under the First
Amendment, that legal constraint hardly renders solipsism nonreligious in a larger sense.
23. Note, Definition of Religion, supra note 7, at 1074-75. "[W]hile parochial to the extent that any
definition formulated on the basis of human experience must be, the ultimate concern approach does as
much as possible to avoid the dangers of religious chauvinism." Id. at 1075. Not surprisingly, Tillich
was extremely interested in the possibility of dialogue and mutual understanding among different
religions. See, e.g., PAUL TILLICH, CHRISTIANITY AND THE ENCOUNTER OF THE WORLD RELIGIONS
(1963).
24. The Supreme Court, relying on Tillich's writings, clearly recognized this characterization of
religion in the conscientious objector exemption case of United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965)
(extending the conscientious objection exemption of the federal draft statute to include individuals
objecting on the basis of personal ethical creeds not affiliated with traditional religion). Rejecting a
theistic model of religious belief, the Court held that "[a] sincere and meaningful belief which occupies
in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for
the exemption" is sufficient to satisfy the statutory free exercise claim. Id. at 176; see also Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (elaborating on Seeger's approach to determining the scope of what
qualifies as "religious" under the statute for the purposes of conscientious objection); United States v.
Ward, 973 F.2d 730, 732 (9th Cir. 1992) (quoting Welsh, 398 U.S. at 340, and asserting in the free
exercise context that "'[r]eligious beliefs' are those that stem from a person's 'moral, ethical, or religious
beliefs about what is right and wrong' and are 'held with the strength of traditional religious
convictions"'); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650 F.2d 430, 440 (2d
Cir. 1981) (employing, in part, an ultimate concern approach in the free exercise context); Malnak v.
Yogi, 592 F.2d 197, 208-09 (3d Cir. 1979) (employing, in part, an ultimate concern approach in the
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deeply trouble some readers,25 however, and because it is offered here
establishment context); United States v. Levy, 419 F.2d 360, 362 (8th Cir. 1969) (employing, in part,
an ultimate concern approach in the statutory conscientious objection context). But see Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 216 (1972) (asserting, in dicta, that "philosophical and personal" beliefs-for
instance, those held by Henry David Thoreau-would not qualify as religious beliefs under the First
Amendment). In the tax preference context as well, the concept of "religion" or "religious" has often
been construed liberally, albeit unsystematically. See BRUCE R. HopKiNS, THE LAW OF TAx-EXEMPT
ORGANIZATIONS §9.2 (6th ed. 1992); 9 MERTENS' THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 34.33,
34.36 (1942 & Supp. 1992).
Outside of these and certain other contexts, the courts have generally not adopted such an inclusive
approach to defining "religion" or "religious." The purpose of citing these examples, however, is not
to argue that "religion" under the First Amendment or the Internal Revenue Code should be interpreted
so inclusively. It is merely to highlight that such an inclusive approach is not so unconventional as to
lie beyond judicial recognition and, as illustrated in the above cases, that in certain contexts such as
conscientious objection or tax exemption, a broad definition of religion may be socially desirable.
25. Some readers may find this approach to be overnclusive, particularly since it appears to recast
as religion what is normally construed simply as philosophy, particularly moral philosophy. See supra
note 18. Of course the outstanding question, then, is whether the conventional line between the religious
and the nonreligious is in fact sound. If instead of choosing a starting point which isolates certain forms
of thinking as religious, one starts from the equally defensible premise that religious thinking is
pervasive, then the task is no longer one of identifying those lines of thought which are religious, but
rather one of identifying and explaining why any given claim about the origin, nature, and purpose of
human beings is not religious in nature. One's starting pomnt, in other words, makes all the difference,
and this Note would argue that a rigorous, more systematic inquiry into the role of religious values in
judicial decision making may ultimately require a more liberal starting point.
Lest too many readers remain troubled, one final analogy might prove helpful. In some respects (and
somewhat ironically), the word "religion" is much like the word "politics" (or, alternatively, the word
"religious" is much like the word "political') when one attempts to actually define each word's scope
and to appreciate the implications of such an undertaking. To call the Supreme Court a political branch
or agency, for example, may be quite troubling to some listeners, especially if, by "political," the listener
has in mind "Republicans versus Democrats, partisan maneuvering, self-serving interest group pressures,
and the realm of will as opposed to the realm of law "Martin Shapiro, Michael. Perry's Morality,
Politics, and Law: Morality and the Politics of Judging, 63 TUL. L. REV. 1555, 1557 (1989).
Yet, to anyone trained in the western tradition, a moment's reflection will show that this
vision of politics as maneuvering for partisan advantage is a very incomplete and
misleading version of what the word "politices" has always meant. [namely] the pursuit
of the good through participation m the life of the community and more particularly
through participation in the process through which the community made its decisions
about what collective actions it should take in pursuit of that goal.
Id. Likewise, to call secular humanism or communism a religious world view may also be troubling,
especially if, by "religious," the listener has in mind Catholic Mass or Jewish Seder, prayer and
meditation, or reliance on divinely inspired texts. Yet to anyone familiar with philosophical and
anthropological approaches to religion, a vision of religion based on Western ideas of congregation,
theism, and ritual is a very incomplete (although not necessarily misleading) version of what the word
"religion" has meant and can mean to different persons in different places at different times. As
Professor Harvey Cox of the Harvard Divinity School has noted, in relation to the First Amendment:
Sensing, perhaps, that the power to define what is or is not a legitimate "religious"
activity seems denied them by the Constitution, the courts, when they cannot avoid a
decision, turn to some vague "man-in-the-street" idea of what "religion" should be: It
involves prayer and has something to do with a deity, etc. But a man-m-the-street
approach would surely have ruled out early Christianity, which seemed both subversive
and atheistic to the religious Romans of the day.
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merely as an example of how expansively the concept of religiousness can
or should be conceived, this Note will generally confine its analysis to
religious claims which most or all persons would recognize as such-once
again, a theologically based position by a traditional religious
organization. Nevertheless, it is important to acknowledge that the line
between the religious and the nonreligious-if it exists at a1126-is
imprecise at best," and that the implications of a policy which generally
seeks to exclude religious values from law making are potentially far
broader than they may appear at first blush.
B The Exclusion of Religion from the American
Law-Making Process
As noted in the Introduction, religion and religious values (at least as
traditionally defined) are generally viewed as illegitimate sources from
which to draw in the judicial decision-making process." One obvious
concern is that a judge's use of religious values might violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment, 29 a matter whih is taken
up extensively in Parts II and III. Other concerns, though, arise from
various characteristics of religion or religious knowledge which some
believe make religion an inherently inappropriate component in the public
policy or law-making process. Accordingly, the remainder of this Part will
discuss and evaluate four such possible characteristics, as well as one
final concern specifically arising from the nature of the judicial decision-
making process itself.30
Harvey Cox, Playing the Devil's Advocate, As It Were, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1977, at A25, reprinted
in LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 14-6, at 827 n.8 (1978).
26. In contrast to a dichotomous model, it may ultimately be most worthwhile to conceive of
religiousness and nonreligiousness as two ends of a continuum, within which one phenomenon can only
be said to be more or less religious relative to another.
27. On this point, at least, most judges and philosophers of religion would probably agree. See
United States v. Kuch, 288 F Supp. 439, 443 (D.D.C. 1968) ("The dividing line between what is, and
what is not, a religion is difficult to draw."); RELIGION: NORTH AMERICAN STYLE, supra note 17, at 3
("Try to define religion and you invite an argument. Scholars have historically resembled the blind
men describing the elephant in the old fable, pointing to different features of religious belief and practice
in offering definitions of religion.").
28. See supra note 2.
29. The religion clauses of the First Amendment to the Constitution provide: "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof ' U.S.
CONST. amend. I.
30. Another immediate concern about the interaction of government and religion, and one not
directly discussed in this Part, is
the tyranny that might result from the government's religious motivation. The fear is that
allowing religious conviction into the dialogue, we stand at the brink of a long and
slippery slope. Near the bottom lies the so-called 'Christian Amendment' to the
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1. The Issue of Accessibility
A principal argument against the use of religious values in law making
is that they may not be "accessible" to all citizens,3' such that their use
would "deny the essential spirit of democracy "32 Advocates of this
argument would hold that public law making demands reliance on reasons
which are accessible to all members of the public, and that inaccessible
reasons-such as those which are religious in origin or reasoning-should
thus not serve as the basis of law " One such advocate describes the
position as follows:
I have in mind those who claim some special, privileged access to the
principles of political morality (or morality in general). Such a position
appears to be endorsed by many religious "fundamentalists," who place
great stock in revelation or the inspired interpretation of sacred texts.
It is not, however, limited to contemporary fundamentalists, but is
shared, for example, by those who accept Plato's vision of the ideal
commonwealth, which was to be governed absolutely by a caste of
"philosopher kings" who alone have access to the otherwise
inaccessible principles of virtue. On this sort of view, moral guidance
is revealed to a select few, and political argument is not public.34
Needless to say, this position rests on a number of premises concerning
the nature of religion, the nature of knowledge, and the nature of the law-
making process. It assumes, for example, that religiously based knowledge
held by some persons is ipso facto inaccessible to others, perhaps since
Constitution. and [at) the bottom of the slope lies something like the Islamic Republic
of Iran
Carter, supra note 2, at 940. This concern, in addition to being questionable in itself, see id. at 940-41,
should properly be viewed as a matter of church-state relations under the Establishment Clause, which
is discussed in Parts II.A and III.B.
31. The idea (and subsequent liberal requirement) of acceskibility seems to incorporate at least two
separate but related concepts: comprehensibility and commonality. Comprehensibility involves the
degree to which particular values or their origin can be intuited or intellectually received, while
commonality involves the degree to which those values or their origin are actually embraced or shared
by members of the political community. The distinction between these two concepts can be illustrated
by comparing a quote from Professor Lyons, see infra text accompanying note 34 (emphasizing
comprehensibility), with a quote from Professor Perry, see infra text accompanying note 40
(emphasizing commonality). This Note primarily focuses on the- issue of comprehensibility, but the
notion of commonality is nevertheless (indeed, inevitably) woven throughout the discussion.
32. DAvID LYONS, ETHICS AND THE RULE OF LAW 191 (1984).
33. See Stephen D. Smith, Separation and the "Secular"- Reconstructing the Disestablishment
Decision, 67 TEX. L. REV. 955, 1007 (1989) (citing GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 56).
34. LYONS, supra note 32, at 189 (footnote omitted); see also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL
JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 10 (1980) ("The germ of the idea is that nobody has the right to
vindicate political authority by asserting a privileged insight into the moral universe which is denied the
rest of us.").
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religious understanding may involve such activities as faith in the
transcendent, prayer to or communion with the transcendent, or
revelation. 35 Likewise, a religiously based public policy argument may
not satisfy the criterion of accessibility "to the extent that it intrinsically
appeals to and includes those who share common religious presuppositions
while simultaneously excluding those who do not subscribe to certain
religious tenets "36
This perspective, however, not only risks mischaracterizing the nature
of religious belief (and thus any values or claims generated by such
belief) but also fails to be equally critical of other supposedly
nonreligious types of knowledge which inform the law-making process.
The accessibility approach, in other words, is both overbroad in its
uncritical disqualification of religion and "underbroad," if you will, in its
uncritical failure to disqualify nonreligion. It would simply be incorrect,
first of all, to begin with the premise that most or all religiously based
knowledge is inaccessible. Such a perspective, in fact, "is very much a
caricature of how religion operates, particularly in the United States, with
its strong tradition of religious dissent-a tradition that permeates even
those denominations that supposedly are most authoritarian. ' 37 To be
sure, it is not exactly clear which aspects or elements of a religious belief
system are genuinely inaccessible. An initial commitment of faith or
belief, for example, may be seen by a nonadherent as an unattractive
undertaking, but the commitment itself as well as the various reasons why
one might undertake such a commitment are not "inaccessible" as such.3 1
Likewise, a subsequent adherence to religious doctrines or norms (such as
those derived from scripture) may also be an undesirable choice from the
nonadherent's viewpoint, but the adherence itself is certainly
35. See John Ladd, Politics and Religion in America: The Enigma of Pluralism, in RELIGION,
MORALITY, AND THE LAW: NOMOS XXX 263, 272-73 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds.,
1988).
36. Frederick Schauer, May Officials Think Religiously?, 27 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1075, 1077
(1986).
37. Carter, supra note 2, at 941. Professor Carter is apparently suggesting that a strong tradition of
dissent indicates that it is unsound to draw a dichotomy between the accessible versus the inaccessible
based on whether one is inside versus outside a particular religious faith, since factions arise within the
same religion. Arguably, such a tradition of dissent is less relevant to the issue of accessibility and more
relevant to the issue of closed-mindedness, discussed infra at part I.B.2., since the presence of competing
positions within a body indicates that at least the body itself is not closed-minded (although each faction
within the body may very well hold to its position in a closed-minded fashion).
38. See, e.g., WILLIAM JAMES, THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE (New American Library,
Inc. 1958) (1902); MICHAEL NOVAK, BELIEF AND UNBELIEF (1965); WAYNE E. OATES, THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION 43-I 10 (1973); KARL RAHNER, FOUNDATIONS OF CHRISTIAN FAITH 1-175
(William V Dych trans., 1978).
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understandable in light of the commitment of faith. 39 And the content of
those doctrines or texts is also accessible to the extent that others may
read and understand their meaning and implications. Stated differently,
to say that an argument satisfies the accessibility standard is not to
suggest that everyone who hears the argument will embrace it.
That a conviction is not shared does not mean that reliance on
it in political argument is necessarily inconsistent with the accessibility
standard. It's difficult to imagine how political argument of any kind,
even political argument steadfastly "secular" in character, could satisfy
a standard that strict.4 °
True, religious claims which allegedly derive from revelation or from
unique communion with some transcendent realm may not be accessible
if they remain entirely unstated or if their particular origin is expressly
asserted to lie beyond the grasp of reasonable perception. But to the
extent that such claims are the only truly inaccessible forms of religious
knowledge, then a per se, blanket exclusion of all religious knowledge
would be grossly overbroad and can only be explained on some other
basis.
4 1
The inaccessibility position may also be grossly underbroad to the extent
it fails to characterize, and thus disqualify, other sources informing the
law-making process which could be consrdered equally inaccessible. It
may be true that a fundamentalist Christian's reliance on inspired textual
interpretation or a Platonist's vision of the ideal commonwealth are
39. See RAHNER, supra note 38, at 407-30; GERD THEISSEN, A CRITICAL FAITH: A CASE FOR
RELIGION 56-71 (John Bowden trans., 1979).
40. Michael J. Perry, Toward an Ecumenical Politics, 20 CAP. U. L. REv. 1, 28-29 (1991)
(emphasis in onginal).
41. One such basis might be the potential impracticality or impossibility of actually distinguishing
accessible religious knowledge from inaccessible religious knowledge. Incidentally, there may be a
logical flaw to a nonadherent's assertion that a religious adherent genuinely has access to knowledge
to which the nonadherent does not. If the nonadherent (especially an atheist or extreme skeptic) truly
believes that the adherent's religion is false, then the nonadherent must also believe that the adherent's
claim to pnvileged or revealed knowledge is also false. Consequently, the adherent's knowledge must
not be privileged or revealed (that is, it must be of human origin), in which case the knowledge is not
inaccessible at all (at least in the sense ofbeing divinely revealed), but instead merely the adherent's
own "intuition" or "conscience," in essence no different from the atheist-nonadherent's. This point
would also seem to be relevant to the preceding question of whether or not an initial commitment of
faith is accessible. Even if the religious adherent claims, for example, that his commitment of faith was
not a rational choice per se, but rather a divinely inspired event, then the atheistic or extremely skeptical
nonadherent still cannot call this event "inaccessible" (at least in the sense of being divinely inspired)
unless he too truly believes that it was a divinely ordained event, in which case the event would not be
entirely inaccessible after all. To the extent, therefore, that the criterion of accessibility is evaluated
subjectively, then the less the nonadherent (or other observer) actually believes the claims of the
adherent, the weaker that nonadherent's accessibility argument will be.
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inaccessible forms of insight, but why draw the line at the Christian or the
Platonist? Is it not true that all persons ultimately rely on forms of insight
which are inaccessible to others? Even those who claim to make nonreli-
gious moral judgments must rely on one or more "personal bases for deci-
sion"-that is, personal perceptions, intuitions, feelings, commitments, and
deferences to the judgment of others "that cannot be justified, in the force
they are given, in terms of publicly accessible reasons. ' 42 In fact, the
model of political discourse-the so-called "liberal dialogue"-which
requires accessibility in the first place is itself an inaccessible ideal.
[T]he liberal dialogue itself proceeds from a privileged insight-the
insight that the state must be neutral among competing conceptions of
the good. That is a nice idea, but the ideal of neutrality, as even its
proponents recognize, cannot be justified in its own terms. It must, in
effect, be assumed. In that sense, it rests on untestable faith-or, put
otherwise, on a privileged insight.
43
If taken to its logical end, therefore, the accessibility requirement would
purge from the law-making process not only certain religious knowledge
but also most moral discourse-including talk of natural or inalienable
rights44-and would consequently reduce the process to a sterile dialogue
about a small body of data on which all citizens can agree.4 5
Because such a result is clearly undesirable, the accessibility
requirement cannot be justified either generally as a sound principle for
public discourse or specifically as a basis to exclude religion from the
law-making process. Likewise, the accompanying notion that religious
knowledge and nonreligious knowledge can be readily distinguished by
their nature is also unsound. Relegating religious knowledge to the
"nonrational" or "subjective" realm of an epistemological system that
42. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 156.
43. Carter, supra note 2, at 941-42 (footnote omitted).
44. One commentator has correctly noted that:
Contemporary philosophical systems based on femminsm, wealth maximization, neutral
conversation, liberal equality, or libertarianism are natural law philosophies. They start
with assumptions about human nature and what is good for people, and they claim to
employ reason to judge the relative justice or injustice of legal practices like slavery, the
free market, patriarchy, and socialism.
Natural law reasoning, like all reasoning, has to proceed from axioms or presupposi-
tions that are not themselves derived from logic.
Phillip E. Johnson, Some Thoughts About Natural Law, 75 CAL. L. REV. 217, 217-18 (1987).
45. See Smith, supra note 33, at 1011 (noting that a genuinely complete application of the public
accessibility requirement would ultimately disqualify "utilitarianism, economic analysis, Kantian ethics,
and every other form of political and moral philosophy," a result that "would paralyze democracy, notpurify it").
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delegitimizes knowledge which is not seen as objective, rational, or
empirically verifiable has been the primary means by which liberalism has
controlled religion since the Enlightenment." Such an epistemological
system, however, has been substantially rejected by philosophers4 and
therefore hardly provides a solid basis on which to separate religious
insight from most other sources of insight. In short, "once a judge's moral
understanding is permitted to play a role, the liberal argument cannot
distinguish religiously based knowledge from other moral knowledge, or
at least, cannot do so without arguments that require a bit too much
cognitive dissonance. 48
Moreover, even if one accepts the premises that religious values are
genuinely inaccessible and that inaccessible arguments should generally
be disfavored in the law-making process, at least one commentator would
still hold that under certain circumstances a judge may rely on- religious
values, in particular on her own religious convictions.
Both because of the indeterminacy of community opinion and because
their task is sometimes to decide by themselves what is right, judges
will occasionally have to decide what is a correct answer to an issue
of moral and political philosophy Let us suppose, for example, that the
judge is interpreting an environmental statute and the statutory
language is unilluminating for the problem at hand. Resolution of the
issue seems finally to turn on how much respect is owed by humans to
the natural world, with no clear guidance from the statute itself or
legislative history I see no escape from the proposition that the judge,
46. Frederick M. Gedicks, The Religious, the Secular, and the Antithetical, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 113,
131 (1991).
47. Id. at 132-38; 2 J. WILLIAM ANGELL & ROBERT M. HELM, MEANING AND VALUE IN WESTERN
THOUGHT 483-88 (1988); Richard A. Baer, Jr., The Supreme Court's Discriminatory Use of the Term
"Sectarian," 6 J.L. & POL. 449, 461-62 (1990); see also Richard S. Myers, The Supreme Court and the
Privatization of Religion, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 19, 72-74 (1991).
The claim that there are rational pnnciples, independent of a metaphysic or a theology,
capable of resolving conflicts between groups with competing interests has shown itself
to be empty. There are in fact competing and contradictory understandings of rationality
and justice, resting on fiduciary formulations which are now rarely examined and whose
importance and indeed existence is frequently denied.
Id. at 72 (emphasis in original) (quoting DUNCAN B. FORRESTER, BELIEFS, VALUES, AND POLICIES:
CONVICTION POLITICS IN A SECULAR AGE 5 (1989)).
48. Carter, supra note 2, at 944. Professor Carter's observation about cognmtive dissonance is not
merely rhetorical; indeed, the more rigorously one examines the proffered rationales for excluding
religious values from the public arena (e.g., inaccessibility and closed-mindedness), the more one senses
that they have a certain sophistic, post facto quality to them. One might even venture to say that they,
along with other related claims, comprise a sort of "Ptolemaic secularism," devoted to the exclusion of
religion at whatever cost, including a willingness to turn a blind eye to illogic and inconsistency.
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like the legislator, may in such settings find it necessary to rely on his
religiously informed answers to what is right 49
Under this alternative model, reliance on religious convictions would be
appropriate precisely when legal reasoning or existing legal sources are
unable to provide the judge with adequate guidance." ° This model, in
other words, considers reliance on religious convictions to be a means of
last resort in the resolution of hard cases, and is therefore more limited
than the position advocated by this Note-namely, that religious values
(including the judge's own convictions) may permissibly enter the
resolution of ethically difficult cases at any stage.5'
In summary, the accessibility requirement and the accompanying
dichotomy between religious and nonreligious knowledge or belief are
arguably irrelevant if not altogether unsound for the purposes of how
judicial decision making is informed. A position against the judicial use
of religious values, therefore, must rest on other grounds.
2. The Issue of Open-Mindedness
A second reason why religion or religious values may be excluded from
the law-making process is that religious adherents are often seen as rigid
or closed-minded in their stances on particular issues, contrary to the
49. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 241; cf. Timothy P Terrell, Flatlaw: An Essay on the
Dimensions of Legal Reasoning and the Development of Fundamental Normative Princples, 72 CAL.
L. REv. 288, 339-42 (1984) (arguing that "fourth-dimensional, transcendental principles," including
religiously-informed ways of thinking, can assist the law in resolving, among other things, environmen-
tal questions).
50. GREENAwALT, supra note 2, at 240-41. Professor Greenawalt's model is but one of many
alternative approaches to dealing with religious values given the liberal notion of accessibility. Professor
Perry of Northwestern University, for example, would permit religious discourse to enter the public
forum so long as the proponent of that discourse is willing "to elaborate [his] position in a manner
intelligible or comprehensible to those who speak a different religious or moral language" and "to
defend [his] position in a manner neither sectarian nor authoritarian." See PERRY, supra note 4, at 105-
06.
51. At the same time, this Note acknowledges certain prudential and constitutional limits on the use
of religious values by judges. See infra part III.A-B. Additionally, this Note does not advocate that a
judge should either immediately or solely rely on religious values, but rather that religious values, like
other sources of insight, can or should be part of the judge's overall decision-making process. Cf Carter,
supra note 2, at 943 (emphasis in original) (remarking that "we ought to be uncomfortable with the idea
that the religiously devout judge will proceed at once to her religious values-but only for the same
reasons that we ought to be uncomfortable with the idea that any judge will proceed at once to her own
values. Even the model of the morally sensitive judge does not propose an entire abandonment of the
norms of judging."). And of course, fundamental standards such as relevance and judicial competence
may also place limits on the role which religious values may play in any particular controversy. See
mfra part III.C.
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liberal democratic requirement that participants in the public forum be
amenable to reason and be willing to strike compromises in the name of
the larger public good.52 The concern, in other words,
is that religious convictions are more rigid than personal bases of
judgment, effectively foreclosing the possibility of effective discourse
and changes of mind in response to publicly accessible reasons. The
idea roughly is that someone who begins with a strong personal sense
on a moral question can be persuaded out of it with good arguments
but that the person with a sense of a religious answer is beyond
persuasion.53
As with the issue of accessibility, however, this perspective fails
because it is both overbroad in its total disqualification of religion and
underbroad in its failure to disqualify certain nonreligious forms of input
which may also involve closed-mindedness. First, "whatever might be said
about the religiously devout, there is no reason-or at least . no a
priori reason-to assume that they are more closed-minded than others of
strong moral beliefs."54
It may be that, in gross, religious convictions leave less room for
further reasoning than personal bases of judgment, but if the worry is
openmindedness and sensitivity to publicly accessible reasons, drawing
a sharp distinction between religious convictions and personal bases [of
judgment] would be an extremely crude tool.55
Second, even if there exists a meaningful correlation between religious
belief and closed-mindedness, it is no less true that many nonreligious
people also manifest closed-mindedness when they take their agendas into
the law-making arena. 6 To assert otherwise, in fact, not only devalues
the genuine tenacity with which many nonreligious persons rightly hold
their moral or political beliefs, but possibly mischaracterizes the American
law-making process, a process which substantially depends on the
existence of a diverse and strongly opinionated citizenry. Indeed, the
adversarial judicial law-making process-even more perhaps than the
legislative law-making process-exists largely because individuals or
52. See id. at 941-42.
53. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 158-59.
54. Carter, supra note 2, at 942.
55. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 159 (emphasis in onginal).
56. Id., see also Carter, supra note 2, at 942. But cf. Robert Audi, Religion and the Ethics of
Political Participation, 100 ETHics 386, 395 (1990) (reviewing GREENAWALT, supra note 2)
(distinguishing between the holding of beliefs and the attitude with which one holds beliefs, and
asserting that the attitude with which religious beliefs are held is different in kind from the attitude with
which nonreligious beliefs are held).
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groups with strongly held beliefs are unable or unwilling to resolve their
disputes nonlitigiously
The requirement of open-mindedness, then, like the requirement of
accessibility, cannot provide a sound basis for excluding religion or
religious values from the law-making arena, including the judicial law-
making process. Perhaps some religious input could be excluded under
this requirement, 7 but so also would a sizeable quantity of nonreligious
input have to be equally excluded. And in the end, the entire notion of
excluding strongly held beliefs should be seriously questioned, as a matter
of both political theory and practical politics.
3. The Legitimacy of Religious Belief Generally
A third reason why religious values may often be singled out for
exclusion is that the underlying religious beliefs are seen by modern
intellectuals as simply illegitimate in an epistemological sense,5 8 a
perspective related to, but certainly deeper than, the issues of accessibility
and the manner in which those beliefs are held.
Today, there is a serious division between religion (especially
conservative religion) and intellectual life. Indeed, the term
"fundamentalist" is generally taken to be a synonym for "anti-
intellectual," and even so-called "liberal" denominations are not taken
seriously to the extent that they cling to beliefs in genuine divinity
Faithfulness to the ideal of the secular society predominates among
American intellectuals, and aggressive secularism pervades American
intellectual life. Public life goes on without religion, although large
numbers of Americans remain religiously faithful in private. 9
57. Within the context of the Establishment Clause, for example, one commentator has suggested
that religions could be viewed and treated differently depending on whether they are "inerrant" or
"dialogic" in their approach to their beliefs and positions. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Religious Purpose,
Inerrancy, and the Establishment Clause, 67 IND. L.J. 1 (1991).
58. E.g., GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 6 ("A good many professors and other intellectuals display
a hostility or skeptical indifference to religion that amounts to a thinly disguised contempt for belief in
any reality beyond that discoverable by scientific inquiry and ordinary human experience."); Richard
H. Hiers, Normative Analysis in Judicial Determination of Public Policy, 3 J.L. & RELIGiON 77, 77 n.2
(1985) ("Generally , legal philosophers, like many other western intellectuals since the Enlighten-
ment, tend to view religion as superstition, and faith as a poor substitute for reason and logic."); see,
e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Outlaw Blues, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1418, 1427 (1989) (asserting, in apparent
seriousness, that "such things as divine revelation and biblical literalism are irrational superstitious
nonsense").
59. Gedicks, supra note 46, at 126 (footnotes omitted); see also Mark Tushnet, Comments on
Gedicks and Ball, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB. POL'Y 457,458 (1990) ("Secularists of a certain
sort denounce the impact of religion on public policy because, in their view, all religions are basically
irrational throwbacks to a pre-Enlightenment era and are therefore fundamentally inconsistent with the
[Vol. 68:433
RELIGIOUS VALUES
Whether or not this view of religion as illegitimate is actually a causal
factor in the exclusion of religious input from the law-making process is
certainly debatable, but one can find evidence of an elitist hostility toward
religious participation in public life6 -- perhaps even in the jurisprudence
of the Supreme Court6"-which may otherwise be difficult to explain.
And even if religious values are not excluded on the grounds that religion
is intellectually illegitimate, their exclusion may nevertheless send that
message to religious and nonreligious persons alike.6 2
To some people, of course, there may be nothing objectionable with a
governmental message that one citizen's world view is intellectually
illegitimate or inferior to another's. To the extent, however, that one
adheres to liberal political ideals such as tolerance and government
neutrality, then the notion that the state may send such messages, whether
explicitly or implicitly, should seem absolutely impermissible. Even more
problematic, the state would presumably be able to take such positions
only if it could convincingly establish that one world view is in fact
superior to another in some meaningful way-hardly a simple task in a
supposedly post-modern age of ontological relativism.
4. The Policy Implications of Religious Values
Still another reason why religious values might be seen as an
inappropriate component of law making may have less to do with the
nature of religious knowledge or adherence as such, and more to do with
the policy implications which are often associated with those values. In
particular, the discomfort which may accompany religious involvement in
the public policy process might stem largely from the fact that religious
groups or organizations not infrequently advocate conservative, liberty-
restrictive policy positions. As a consequence, the exclusion of religious
values might ultimately be more a political or ideological matter than an
epistemological or constitutional one.63
personal traits that they think desirable in citizens of a post-Enlightenment democracy.").
60. See Frederick M. Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Democracy, Autonomy, and Values: Some
Thoughts on Religion and Law in Modern America, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1579, 1584-85 (1987).
61. Id. at 1584-85, 1612-15. See generally Baer, supra note 47; David W. Louisell, Does the
Constitution Require a Purely Secular Society?, 26 CATH. U. L. REV. 20 (1976) (arguing that the
Supreme Court "tilts" the Constitution against religion in favor of a purely secular society).
62. Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 60, at 1598.
63. Cf id..
It is not clear what there is about religious morality that renders it unacceptably subjective
and private that is not also true of secular morality. It may be that, because the source of
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Although this thesis may seem questionable on its face, it acquires
credibility when one juxtaposes different public policy issues or stances
and observes that a double standard appears to exist regarding the
perception of religious participation in public life. Under this model,
religious participation in public life is apparently acceptable, even
encouraged, on certain issues or when religion supports certain
viewpoints-for example, when religious groups oppose nuclear
proliferation or favor more social welfare programs-but it is forbidden
on certain other issues or when religion supports certain other
viewpoints-for example, when religious groups oppose legalized abortion
or legalized euthanasia. 64 As an illustration, one need only compare the
praise given to religious groups and leaders for participating in the civil
rights movement of the 1960s to the criticism and often harsh treatment
given to religious groups and leaders for participating in the anti-abortion
movement of the 1980s and 1990s. 65 One can clearly make qualitative
distinctions between the two issues juxtaposed in this illustration, but such
ultimate authority for most modem secular moral theory usually is some elaboration of
the principle of self-interest, secular morality appears consistent with liberal theories of
government in a way that religious morality, with its reliance on the external judgment
of the divine, does not.
Id. at 1597-98 (footnote omitted); see also Hiers, supra note 58, at 77 n.2 (speculating that legal
philosophers' and other western intellectuals' poor perceptions of religion may "have been shaped by
familiarity with cases in which proponents of religion have appeared as enemies of human well-
being-in opposition, for instance, to the teaching of evolution or of literature, and to blood transfusion
or other apparently beneficial forms of medical intervention").
64. See, e.g., Henry J. Hyde, Keeping God in the Closet: Some Thoughts on the Exorcism of
Religious Values from Public Life, I NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PuB. POL'Y 33, 40-42 (1984). To
illustrate the apparent double standard at work, Representative Hyde provides the following example
taken from the 1984 Presidential election campaign:
Had the Archbishop of New York quizzed a conservative Catholic President about his
commitment to nuclear arms control, would there have been impassioned hand-wringing
at the New York Times editorial board about "mixing politics and religion"9 Yet this is
precisely what happened when the Archbishop of New York questioned a liberal
Democratic candidate for Vice President about her approach to the public policy of
abortion. Why is it that Archbishop O'Connor threatens the separation of church and state
when he tries to clarify Catholic teaching about abortion, and the Rev. Jesse Jackson does
not when he organizes a partisan political campaign through the agency of dozens of
churches?
Id. at 41-42; see also John H. Garvey, A Comment on Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH.
L. REv. 1288 (1986):
[Certain religious claims are allowed and others are disqualified] not because they are
religious per se but because of their content. The difference between calling homosexuali-
ty a sin and calling gene-splicing a sin is not that the former claim is religious and the
latter secular. It is that the former claim collides with a good that liberal democracy
values more highly.
Id. at 1292.
65. See James T. Burtchaell, Travesty at Wichita, CHPdsTIANiTY TODAY, Nov. 11, 1991, at 20-21.
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distinctions will probably not erase the double standard apparently at work
in the contemporary treatment of religious participation in public life.
In summary, then, the exclusionary treatment of religion and religious
values from the public policy or law-making arena may actually be an
ideologically selective phenomenon, depending largely on the subject
matter or viewpoint of the speaker's message rather than the accessibility
of that message or the speaker's relative open-mindedness."
5 The Issue of Judicial Objectivity or Impartiality
There is one final principal argument against judicial reliance on
religious values, especially where a judge relies on her own religious
convictions. Such reliance may be seen as illegitimate to the extent that
judging should be an "objective" activity, one which should not rest on
"subjective" sources such as religious knowledge. In other words, a
judge's reliance on her own religious convictions (and perhaps on those
of others') might be incompatible "with the ideal of fairness that lies at
the heart of the notion of reasoned justice under law-the ideal, which
retains its vitality even in a post-Realist age, that judicial decision making
should be 'objective' or 'impartial."' 67
66. This may not be entirely accurate to the extent that different religious claims are treated
differently not only on the basis of their content, but also on the basis of what kind of religious
organization or person is asserting them. For example, a claim made by a theologically liberal religious
organization (eg., a mainline Protestant Christian denomination) may be treated differently from a
similar claim made by a theologically-conservative religious organization (e.g., a fundamentalist
Protestant Christian denomination), perhaps on the basis of perceived open-mindedness. To completely
separate the issues of accessibility, open-mindedness, intellectual legitimacy, and policy implications,
therefore, may be misleading, since these factors may be substantially interrelated.
67. Richard H. Fallon, Of Speakable Ethics and Constitutional Law: A Review Essay, 56 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1523, 1547 (1989) (reviewing PERRY, infra note 109). Professor Fallon thus rejects judicial
reliance on religious values despite his recognition of the "important and thought-provoking" argument
that:
If we want judges to act as moral decision makers even when they cannot employ
society's morality as their standard of moral reference, and if judges' personal moral
views are determined by their religious convictions, we cannot sensibly ask them to
exclude from their calculations what many of them may view as the most relevant source
of moral guidance.
Id. at 1546-47. The notion of "impartiality" is certainly a characteristic expected ofjudges, and is cited
numerous times in the American Bar Association's Model Code ofJudicial Conduct. See MODEL CODE
OF JuDiCiAL CONDucr (1990); see also JEFFREY M. SHAMAN Er AL., JUDICIAL CONDUCT AND ETHiCs
§ 5.01 (1990) (stating that "[there is perhaps no more basic precept pertaining to the judiciary than the
one which holds that judges should be sufficiently detached and free from predisposition in their
decision-making."). The term "impartiality" is not defined, however, and the Model Code does not
suggest that judicial reference to or reliance on religious values when resolving cases would constitute
a breach of impartiality.
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Judges, however, must often rely on so-called nonlegal factors,
including their own sense of morality (whether or not immediately
religious in origin), when deciding cases where statutory language and
precedent are ultimately unhelpful. And as a practical matter, any way a
judge decides a case-for example, one involving the scope of a litigant's
sexual privacy-she must necessarily embrace certain explicit and implicit
political, social, and moral philosophical positions at the expense of
others, with her choice of outcome inevitably reflecting her own
philosophical worldview Thus, for example, merely because the Supreme
Court in Bowers v Hardwick6 claimed, in the name of judicial
legitimacy, to be adhering to seemingly neutral factors such as precedent,
tradition, and the "language or design of the Constitution, '69 it inevitably
rested its decision on certain views about human beings, human society,
and the state.7" And can one say whether the judicial decision making in
Bowers was objective or subjective? Impartial or partial? These are
difficult questions, of course, in large part because a dichotomy between
subjective and objective judicial decision making is not necessarily
.helpful. Judges should certainly strive to be comprehensive and to avoid
parochialism when deciding cases, but to ask them to ignore their own
conceptions of reality and ethics is itself a form of partiality-albeit away
from the judge's own philosophical framework-and is hardly realistic in
light of contemporary understandings of the judicial mind.7
As an aside, Professor Fallon's "post-Realist" conception ofjudicial objectivity, which is probably
rather orthodox today, should be contrasted with the pre-legal realist, legal positivistic model of law
making, which itself provides another, quite different argument against the judicial use of religious
values. Under that model, not only were judges supposed to be objective and merely apply (not make)
the law, but the law which the legislators created was to be "scientifically" constructed, liberated from
the quite unscientific influences of morality and religion. Cf, e.g., HENRY S. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 15
(Beacon Press 1970) (10th ed. 1884) (emphasis in original) (asserting, in a delightful blend of Social
Darwinism and legal positivism, that "the severance of law from morality, and of religion fim law,
belong[] very distinctly to the later stages of mental progress").
68. 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (upholding Georgia's criminal anti-sodomy statute as applied to
homosexual sodomy).
69. Id. at 190-94.
70. See, e.g., Anne B. Goldstein, Comment, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values:
Searchingfor the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073 (1988).
71. See, e.g., SHAMAN ET AL., supra note 67, § 5.04, at 105 ("Despite earlier fictions to the
contrary, it is now understood that judges are not without opinions when they hear and decide cases.
Judges do have values, which cannot be magically shed when they take the bench."); cf Charles E.
Clark, The Limits of Judicial Objectivity, 12 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1963). It may be especially impractical,
moreover, to ask a judge to ignore her own sense of reality and morality when that sense is a direct
product of religious faith. See nfra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
This is not to say that a judge's reference to her own religious convictions should never be classified
as impartiality or bias. There may be particular settings-the criminal sentencing context, for
example-where such references might be inappropriate as a matter of due process. See, e.g., United
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II. ARGUMENTS FOR THE USE OF RELIGIOUS VALUES
IN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING
Because this Note's thesis runs counter to the conventional
understanding, many of the arguments in this Part and in Part I are
negative in form-that is, they proceed largely by refuting conventional
arguments. The ultimate aim of this Part, however, is to move beyond
refutation and explain why, and in what ways, judges legitimately can or
should employ religious values when deciding hard cases. With this end
in mind, the propriety of the judicial use of religious values will be
examined from four perspectives: historical-constitutional, political-
philosophical, utilitarian, and empirical.
A. The Historical- Constitutional Perspective
It is beyond question that religious values have informed American
jurisprudence from the time of the nation's birth.72 "[R]eligion and
jurisprudence are so related," in fact, "that to understand American legal
history, one must understand American religion."7 3 It is not until recent
States v. Bakker, 925 F.2d 728 (4th Cir. 1991) (vacating, on due process grounds, the defendant's
sentence after the trial judge adverted to his own religiosity in the sentencing process, apparently to the
defendant's disadvantage). Yet, it might be difficult to explain why the criminal sentencing context
would be a uniquely inappropriate setting for a judge to advert to religious values. Might Bakker, for
example, have come out differently if the judge in his sentencing determination had adverted to his own
religiosity in favor of the defendant? And cf State v. Reimer, 629 P.2d 695 (Idaho 1981) (holding that
the sentencing court's reference to Christianity, in a manner unfavorable to the defendant, was not an
abuse of discretion).
72. See, e.g., Harold Berman, The Interaction of Law and Religion, 31 MERCER L. REv. 405, 406
(1980) [hereinafter Berman, Law and Religion]; see also KERMIT C. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW
IN AMERICAN HISTORY 14-16, 26 (1989); NATHANIEL MICKLEM, LAW AND THE LAWS 8 (1952);
CUSHING STROUT, THE NEW HEAVENS AND NEW EARTH: POLITICAL RELIGION IN AMERICA 99 (1974)
(noting that many early state court decisions "assumed that Christianity was itself part of the common
law inherited from England'); Joseph Story, Christianity a Part of the Common Law, 9 Am. JURIST 346
(1833) (likewise asserting that America's common law inhentance included Christianity). See generally
HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION
(1983); Harold J. Berman, The Religious Foundations of Western Law, 24 CATH. U. L. REV. 490 (1975);
Harold J. Berman, The Religious Sources of General Contract Law: An Historical Perspective, 4 J.L.
& RELIGION 103 (1986); Symposium on the Religious Foundations of Civil Rights Law, 5 J.L. &
RELIGION 1 (1987). But cf. Helen K. Michael, The Role of Natural Law in Early American
Constitutionalism: Did the Founders Contemplate Judicial Enforcement of "Unwritten" Individual
Rights?, 69 N.C. L. REv. 421,440-41 (1991) (asserting, in regard to the concept ofjudicial review, that
Amencan colonial religious thought generated distrust of judicial discretion in the enforcement and
interpretation of laws).
73. Timothy L. Fort, A Jurisprudence of Faith: An Experiment in Using Theology to Interpret
Jurisprudence, 30 CATH. LAW. 22 (1985).
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generations that "the public philosophy of America [has] shifted radically
from a religious to a secular theory of law -714 Of course, a recognition
that religious values have historically informed the decision making of
judges does not alone justify .contemporary judicial reliance on them. It
would be equally unjustifiable, however, to ignore the historical role of
religion and to assert, explicitly or implicitly, that American law is not a
product of such reliance.75 And in light of religion's traditional place in
judicial decision making, it might also be analytically erroneous to place
the burden of justification on those who assert a role for religious values.
From a historical perspective, in fact, perhaps the burden should be on
those who seek to exclude religion or religious values-on the grounds,
for example, that those values are somehow qualitatively and meaningfully
different from nonreligious values (which, as illustrated earlier, is no
simple task).76
Closely related to the historical perspective is the perspe6tive derived
from the principles and language of the federal Constitution, which
contains a number of clauses relevant to the interaction of law and
religion." The most obvious constitutional objection to the judicial use
of religious values is that such use might violate the Establishment Clause
of the First Amendment.7" Since judges-either through common law or
74. Berman, Law and Religion, supra note 72, at 408.
75. Cf, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1985). Professor
Friedman's widely used book is cited here not for what it says, but rather for what it fails to say, about
the role of religion in American legal history. If, for example, one were interested in reading about the
relationship between law and religion generally, or between law and Christianity specifically, then one
would need to look elsewhere, since those words do not even appear as entries in the index. Indeed, a
perusal through the entire volume generally leaves one with the impression that American law was, and
is, almost completely unrelated to religious thought. Such omissions are truly unfortunate and may result
simply from the fact that "[m]any secular-minded historians often forget that their own preference for
nonreligious thinking cannot simply be projected backward into the past." STROUT, supra note 72, at
xiii.
76. See supra Parts L.A & I.B.I-2.
77. In addition to the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment, the
Constitution also prohibits the use of a religious test or oath as a requirement to holding public office.
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3. This Note's focus on the federal Constitution should not foreclose a
similar examination of state constitutional provisions which affect the interaction of government and
religion. For partial overviews of this area of law, see generally G. Alan Tarr, Church and State in the
States, 64 WASH. L. REv. 73 (1989), and Linda S. Wendtland, Note, Beyond the Establishment Clause:
Enforcing Separation of Church and State through State Constitutional Provisions, 71 VA. L. REV. 625
(1985).
78. See George E. Garvey, Book Review, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 801, 805 (1984) (reviewing
MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1982)). "A decision based
on a judge's conclusion that a particular Roman Catholic, Protestant or other moral view is superior to
that of competing philosophies would likely shock the nation. The 'wall of separation' would be viewed
as breached in a most egregious manner." Id. Professor Garvey further notes, though, that "[i]t should
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statutory construction-effectively make law,79 and since judges are
officers of the government, then their use of religious values when
rendering decisions could very well violate the Establishment Clause."
Such use, for example, might be seen as impermissibly favoring religion
over irreligion or favoring one religion over others,8 ' primarily
advancing or endorsing religion generally, or excessively entangling the
government with religion"2 -any or all of which could be considered an
be no less shocking, however, for the courts to refuse to consider the moral teachings of religious
traditions when making moral value judgments. The constitutionalization of a secular moral philosophy,
to the exclusion of traditional religious moral views, would be tantamount to establishing a secular
federal religion." Id.
79. LYONS, supra note 32, at 88 ("If courts render authoritative interpretations of the law, but they
have discretion to decide its meaning when it is unclear, then they do not simply apply the law. They
also help to make it. They do not simply adjudicate: they also 'legislate"); Forer, supra note 5, at 287-
88 ("Despite comprehensive legislative codes-the Uniform Commercial Code, the Model Penal Code,
class action procedural rules and similar carefully drafted statutes and rules-lacunae that call for
interstitial legislation and interpretation are inevitable. Even the wisest drafters cannot anticipate all
problems.').
80. This is not to say that where judges do not "make law," their use of religious values might not
violate the Establishment Clause, since they most certainly remain state actors. See, e.g., North Carolina
Civil Liberties Union Legal Found. v. Constangy, 947 F.2d 1145 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that a judge's
opening prayer violated the Establishment Clause), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992). The case. for
establishment, though, seems strongest (or at least most paradigmatic) when the governmental activity
in question is law making.
81. E.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (asserting that the Establishment Clause
requires, among other things, that "[n]either a state nor the Federal Government can prefer one
religion over another"); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
82. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, the Court set forth the following
three-prong analysis to evaluate the constitutionality of governmental actions challenged under the
Establishment Clause: "First, the statute [or governmental action] must have a secular legislative
purpose; second, its pnncipal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion;
finally, the statute [or governmental action] must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with
religion."' Id. at 612-13 (citations omitted). In more recent cases, the Court has expanded on the first
and second prongs using an "endorsement" analysis proposed by Justice O'Connor. For example,
regarding the second prong (which examines the effect of a governmental action), the clause may be
violated if"government. [appears] to take a position on questions of religious belief or '[makes]
adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's standing in the political community."' County
of Allegheny v. ACLU Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 594 (1989) (holding unconstitutional
an unaccompanied Christian nativity scene on a county courthouse's main staircase, while holding
constitutional a Jewish Chanukah menorah situated next to a Christmas tree and a sign saluting liberty).
For further discussion regarding all three prongs of Lemon, see infra part III.B.
It is not clear how viable the endorsement approach will prove to be in future litigation, especially
outside the context of religious symbolism cases. More significantly, the status of Lemon-based
Establishment Clause doctrine in general is currently considered uncertain. First, as many scholars and
judges have pointed out, it is problematic in both theory and application. See, e.g., Carl H. Esbeck, The
Lemon Test: Should It Be Retained, Reformulated or Rejected?, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB.
POL'Y 513 (1990); William P. Marshall, UnprecedentialAnalysis and OnginalIntent, 27 WM. & MARY
L. REv. 925, 928 (1986) (noting that the existing jurisprudence of the religion clauses "admittedly is
inconsistent and at times incomprehensible"); Smith, supra note 33, at 956; The Supreme Court, 1991
Term-Leading Cases, 106 HARV. L. REV. 163, 260 nn.5-6 (1992). Second, it is particularly unstable
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"establishment" under the clause.
As a textual and historical matter, however, invoking the Establishment
Clause to prohibit judicial reliance on religious values has little to
recommend it; indeed, the words and background of the Constitution
would seem to argue against such an approach. 3 First, as a matter of
straightforward textual construction and original intent (to the extent the
latter can be divined), the Establishment Clause was designed to deal only
with actions of the federal legislature, 4 and therefore its application to
the judiciary, whether federal or state, or to state governmental actions in
general, should be viewed primarily as the product of recent, extra-
constitutional judicial interpretation. 5 Second, the historical relationship
at present due to changes on the Court (namely, the replacement of former Justices Brennan and
Marshall with Justices Souter and Thomas, respectively) and because of a strong dissenting faction
within the Court. In County of Allegheny, for example, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia, dissented at length, sharply criticizing the endorsement
.approach and acknowledging that "[p]ersuasive criticism of Lemon has emerged." See County of
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 655-79 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). To be sure, this doctrinal instability remains
even after Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649 (1992) (holding unconstitutional a rabbi's deliverance of
a theistic prayer at a middle school graduation), a case which many believed would result in a partial
or total rejection of the Lemon analysis. See Robert L. Cord, Church, State, and the Rehnquist Court,
NAT'L REV., Aug. 17, 1992, at 35, 36-37 (suggesting that "[e]ven though the graduation-ceremony
invocation was declared unconstitutional in Lee v. Weisman, it is premature to conclude that the
Rehnquist Court will necessarily follow the Warren and Burger Courts' Establishment Clause
jurisprudence"). Effectively ignoring Lemon, the five-member Weisman majority (per Justice Kennedy)
instead employed a psychological coercion analysis, more or less proposed by Kennedy in his County
of Allegheny dissent.
83. This Note's Establishment Clause analysis is essentially limited to questions of text, history, and
contemporary doctrine, and does not explicitly attempt to develop its thesis according to the vast realm
of "constitutional values." Examples of this latter sort of analysis might include Danel 0. Conlde,
Toward a General Theory of the Establishment Clause, 82 Nw. U.L. REv. 1113 (1988), or John H.
Mansfield, The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment and the Philosophy of the Constitution, 72
CAL. L. REv. 847 (1984). Of course, constitutional values may embrace many of the perspectives which
are discussed in this Note, including tradition, political theory, social utility, and various practical or
prudential concerns.
84. ROBERT L. CORD, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE: HISTORICAL FACT AND CURRENT
FICTION 12 (1982) (concluding that the intention of the ratifiers was "to deny Congress the power to
establish a national religion"). This interpretation is certainly one reasonable construction of the language
of the First Amendment: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion
U.S. CONT. amend. I (emphasis added).
85. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (extending the Establishment Clause to all
governmental actions at the federal and state levels). As Professor Gunther notes, "Everson assumed
without significant discussion that the establishment clause was incorporated into the 14th Amendment
and was therefore applicable to the states. The Court did not address the contention that the language
of the 14th Amendment may present a textual barrier to incorporation of the establishment clause."
GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1508 (12th ed. 1991); see also Mary Ann Glendon & Raul
F Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REv. 477, 481-86 (1991); Note, Rethinking the
Incorporation of the Establishment Clause: A Federalist View, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1700 (1992). Even
if the clause itself did not solely name "Congress," incorporation to the states is still problematic since
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between religious values and law making, discussed above, was certainly
in force at the time the Constitution was created; indeed, a separation of
religious values from the legal and political processes would not even
have been comprehensible to the drafters of that document. 6
The authors of the Constitution, including those who were very
skeptical of the truth of traditional theistic religion, did not doubt that
the validity of the legal system itself depended on the validity of
religious faith, and more particularly of the Protestant Christian faith
that predominated the new American Republic.
8 7
To be sure, much of the Constitution itself-notably the Establishment
the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause provides only that no "State [shall] deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. The issue of
establishment, however, is not necessarily an issue of "life, liberty, or property", indeed, the major
counterargument-namely, that "liberty of conscience" is implicated-is potentially undermined by the
existence of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment. See GUNTHER, supra, at 1508 & n.2. And
the Fourteenth Amendment Privileges and Immunities Clause, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1-providing
that "[n]o State shall enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States"--is even less relevant than the Due Process Clause as a matter of the Supreme
Court's own interpretation. See CORD, supra note 84, at 84-101; LEONARD W. LEvY, THE ESTABLISH-
MENT CLAUSE: RELIGION AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 165-85 (1986).
86. Smith, supra note 33:
If the possibility of separating church and state presented eighteenth century Americans
with a genuine option, the separation of politics and religion, or of government and
religion, did not. Religious premises, assumptions, and values provided the general
framework within which most Americans thought about and discussed important
philosopiucal, moral, and political issues. For that reason, Americans of the time could
not seriously contemplate a thoroughly secular political culture from which religious
beliefs, motives, purposes, rhetoric, and practices would be filtered out.
Id. at 966; see also HENRY F. MAY, THE ENLIGHTENMENT IN AMERICA (1976):
[WMe may be able to understand [late eighteenth century] political thought better if we
start where they nearly always did, with religion. Men of the late eighteenth century,
whether they were Calvinists or Arminians, deists or atheists, seldom thought about any
branch of human affairs without refemng consciously to some general beliefs about the
nature of the universe and man's place in it, and about human nature itself.
Id. at xiii-xiv; see also NORMAN COUsINs, "IN GOD WE TRUST" THE RELIGIOUS BELIEFS AND IDEAS
OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING FATHERS (1958); ELLIS SANDOz, A GOvERNMENT OF LAWS: POLITICAL
THEORY, RELIGION, AND THE AMERICAN FOUNDING (1990); M.E. Bradford, Religion and the Framers:
The Biographical Evidence, 4 BENCHMARK 349 (1990); Richard Vetterli & Gary C. Bryner, Religion,
Public Virtue, and the Founding of the American Republic, in TOWARD A MORE PERFECT UNION: SIX
ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION 91, 100 (Neil L. York ed., 1988) ("The Founders as a whole were deeply
religious men. Religion played a vital role in most of their lives; it influenced their beliefs and activities,
their ideals and hopes.").
87. Berman, Law and Religion, supra note 72, at 406. Founding era statesmen such as Washington,
Adams, and even Jefferson (whose legacy includes the rather hackneyed "wall of separation" metaphor)
all envisioned the new nation as being overseen by God, and as being comprised of citizens whose
morality was essentially religious in origin. EDWIN S. GAUSTAD, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF AMERICA
123-27 (new rev. ed. 1990); Franklin I. Gamwell, Religion and Reason in American Politics, 2 J.L. &
RELIGION 325, 332 (1984).
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Clause-was substantially informed by religious values and beliefs about
the nature of human beings and the state,88 and thus to interpret the
clause as completely prohibiting the use of religious values in law making
is counterintuitive if not somewhat bizarre.89
Of course, a historical perspective on the Constitution should not
necessarily dictate our current understanding of that document, and
therefore the contemporary constitutional perspective must be examined
as well. At what points and for what reasons judicial reliance on religious
88. See SANDOZ, supra note 86, at 178-96; 1-2 CHRISTIAN HISTORY OF THE CONsTrrITioN (Joseph
A. Montgomery ed., 1960-62); Conkle, supra note 57, at 7 ("Many of our laws, even our basic system
of constitutional government and individual rights, rest to a significant degree on religious understand-
ings of the world, of human beings, and of social relationships."); Symposium, Religious Dimensions
of American Constitutionalism, 39 EMORY L.J. 1 (1990).
Indeed, the principle of nonestablishment, of separating church from state, was as much expounded
by the churches (the "evangelical separatists") as by the less religious political leaders (the
"Enlightenment separatists") of the founding era. See John Witte, The Theology and Politics ofthe First
Amendment Religion Clauses: A Bicentennial Essay, 40 EMORY L.J. 489, 491-97 (1991). According to
Professor Witte:
The primary purpose of the evangelical separatists was religious, not political. They
sought to free religion and the church from the intrusions of politics and the state.
Only when freed from the fetters of the law, they believed, could religion properly exert
its leavening influence on society. Only when relieved of the restrictions of the state
could the church properly exercise its ministry and mission in the community.
Id. at 494; see also ARLIN M. ADAMS & CHARLES J. EMMERICH, A NATION DEDICATED TO RELIGIOUS
LIBERTY 51-65 (1990). Some scholars, in fact, have even questioned whether there was any truly
nonreligious line of thought underlying the founding era conception of the proper religion-government
relationship. See Steven D. Smith, The Rise and Fall of Religious Freedom in Constitutional Discourse,
140 U. PA. L. Rev. 149, 159-63 (1991). It is equally true today that church-state separation is as much
motivated by religious as by nonreligious interests, as the continuing role of the religiously affiliated,
politically active Americans United for Separation of Church and State (AU) makes evident. Given this
reality, it is only fair to inquire whether a judge who receives and reviews briefs by AU (among other
separationist religious groups) is being influenced by religious values or considerations, and in turn
whether such influence should itself be considered a form of establishment.
89. Cf Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2661 (1992) ("A relentless and all-pervasive attempt to
exclude religion from every aspect of public life could itself become inconsistent with the Constitution.!)
(citing Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 306 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring)); Harold
O.J. Brown, Ethical Questions in Fetal Research, 1 HUM. LIFE REv. 118 (1975) (quoted in Louisell,
supra note 61, at 28-29):
If the First Amendment is understood (as the Court now seems to understand it) as a
prohibition of any governmental recognition of fundamental convictions of a religious
origin, then it means something it surely never was intended to mean: the cutting off of
American society from its spiritual and cultural roots in the Judaeo-Chnstian tradition.
Id. at 124. Indeed, while it would be basically naive to reject the notion of a living constitution, it is
troubling to think that the modem interpretation of a clause should be so variant from the original
understanding that, had the framers or ratifiers known of this interpretation, the clause might never have
been proposed or ratified in the first place. Cf Laura Zwicker, Note, The Politics of Toleration: The
Establishment Clause and the Act of Toleration Examined, 66 IND. L.J. 773, 793-94 (1991) ("[Ilt is
unlikely that the New England states would have supported the establishment clause if it had meant.
that states could no longer provide public support for religion or maintain an established church.").
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values would constitute "an establishment of religion" according to
contemporary doctrine will be addressed below in Part III.B, since that
doctrine clearly imposes limits on the role which religious values can play
in the judicial decision-making process.
Before moving on to the political-philosophical perspective, one final
dimension of the contemporary constitutional perspective should be noted.
The Court's expansion of the Establishment Clause has come almost
exclusively from its broad approach to the question of what constitutes an
"establishment." 90 Accordingly, there should be concern over why the
Court has not been equally or proportionately expansive in its approach
to the question of what constitutes "religion" for the purposes of the
clause. As demonstrated in Part L.A, for example, an expansive approach
to defining "religion" is clearly possible, and in fact the Court has
interpreted the term expansively in other contexts such as free exercise
and taxation. 9' This interpretative dissymetry is troubling, both as a
textual matter92 and as a matter of judicial accountability,93 and perhaps
the Court is simply trying to prevent the serious societal and political
consequences which would result were "religion" to be read broadly in the
establishment context. Under such a reading, the government could almost
90. TRIBE, supra note 7, § 14-6, at 1187.
91. See supra note 24 regarding the conscientious objection and taxation cases. See also Torcasso
v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 495 n.1 1 (1961) (explicitly recognizing "Secular Humanism" as a religion
in the United States); Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1536 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985); Rhode Island Fed'n of Teachers v. Norberg, 630 F.2d 850, 854 (1st Cir.
1980) (asserting that secular humanism may be a religion); Crowley v. Smithsonian Inst., 636 F.2d 738,
742-43 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (assuming secular humanism to be a religion for the purpose of analysis).
92. After all, "religion" is mentioned only once in the First Amendment, and therefore to read it
one way for the Establishment Clause and another way for the Free Exercise Clause is clearly
problematic as a matter of textual interpretation. See TRIBE, supra note 7, § 14-6, at 1186; Everson v.
Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
93. "Judicial accountability" is the notion that the courts, as a matter of their own legitimacy, have
some degree of responsibility to adequately justify, or at least explain, their decisions to those persons
or bodies to whom the courts are accountable-the citizenry, the other branches of government, and so
on. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791 (1992):
The underlying substance of [the Court's] legitimacy is of course the warrant for the
Court's decisions in the Constitution and the lesser sources of legal pnnciple on which
the Court draws. That substance is expressed in the Court's opinions, and our contempo-
rary understanding is such that a decision without pnncipled justification would be no
judicial act at all.
Id. at 2814. If the Supreme Court were to construe "religion" the same way for both religion clauses,
then this consistency alone would arguably provide some degree of accountability, though the
construction itself may or may not be justified. Likewise, were the Court to construe "religion"
differently for each clause, as the Court seems to do, then it should assume the extra burden of
explaining such a disparity, in addition to justifying each construction independently. To the extent,
therefore, that the Court has adopted disparate interpretations between the clauses, and to the extent that
the Court has failed to adequately explain this disparity, there arises a problem ofjudicial accountability.
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never be genuinely neutral with regard to religion (since it must always
rely on some vision of ultimate human purpose), and the disestablishment
crusade which might follow-for example, the removal of secular
humanism from the public education system-would be devastating.9 4 In
short, the Court would ultimately have to acknowledge the possibility that,
at some level, "[e]very law system is an enactment of and an
establishment of religion." '
B. The Political-Philosophical Perspective
In addition to historical and constitutional support, the judicial use of
religious values finds justification in various principles of contemporary
political philosophy, particularly in notions of participatory government
and communitarian theory
1 Religious Values and the Model of Inclusive Pluralism
Any discussion of American political theory should begin with a
recognition of this nation's vast diversity, whether racial, religious,
94. See, e.g., Grove v. Mead Sch. Dist. No. 354, 753 F.2d 1528, 1537 (9th Cir. 1985) ('To borrow
the ultimate concern test from the free exercise context and use it with present establishment clause
doctrines would be to invite attack on all programs that further the ultimate concerns of individuals or
entangle the government with such concerns."), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 826 (1985); Anita Bowser,
Delimiting Religion in the Constitution: A Classification Problem, 11 VAL. U. L. REv. 163, 197-204
(1977); Ingber, supra note 7, at 270-71; James McBride, Paul Tillich and the Supreme Court: Tillich's
"Ultimate Concern" as a Standard in Judicial Interpretation, 30 J. CHURCH & ST. 245, 247, 270-71
(1988); David G. Leitch, Note, The Myth of Religious Neutrality by Separation in Education, 71 VA.
L. REV. 127 (1985); Note, Definition of Religion, supra note 7, at 1083-84. Professor Tribe, who now
questions the propriety of interpreting "religin" differently for each clause, at one time argued that a
dual (or "variable") definitional approach was preferable for reasons similar to those given by the court
in Grove. See TRIBE, supra note 25, § 14-6, at 826-33. In the first edition of his treatise, for example,
Professor Tribe asserted that:
[I]n the age of the affirmative and increasingly pervasive state, a less expansive notion
of religion [than that employed in the Free Exercise Clause] was required for establish-
ment clause purposes lest all "humane" programs of government be deemed constitution-
ally suspect. Such a twofold definition of religion-expansive for the free exercise clause,
less so for the establishment clause-may be necessary to avoid confronting the state with
increasingly difficult choices that the theory of permissible accommodation could not
indefinitely resolve.
Id. at 827-28. In the second edition of his treatise, however, Professor Tribe substantially abandoned his
advocacy of this dual-definitional approach, conceding that it "constitutes a dubious solution" to the
apparent problem of a tension or conflict between the two clauses, "a problem that, on closer inspection,
may not exist at all." TRIBE, supra note 7, § 14-6, at 1186.
95. RoUSAS J. RUSHDOONY, CHRISTIANITY AND THE STATE 82 (1986). For further discussion
concerning the proposition that government actions are inevitably religious, see Ingber, supra note 7,
at 270 n.236.
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cognitive, or cultural. Nowhere is this aspect of American society more
evident, in fact, than in the varied religious beliefs of its members.9 6 Not
surprisingly, the American political law-making system both reflects and
strives to foster this diversity through the liberal philosophical ideal of
tolerant pluralism, where the endorsement of any one individual's or
group's views at the expense of others' is seen as anti-pluralistic,
intolerant, and thus unacceptable.97 "Liberal government," in other
words, "is understood to be neutral government,"9 " and as such it
practices a policy of exclusive pluralism: the exclusion of any particular
conception of societal good so that each individual or group may be free
to follow his own such conception.99 This may be achieved by voluntary
exclusion-where individuals or groups voluntarily refrain from injecting
their own beliefs into the law-making process-or it may be achieved by
involuntary exclusion-where those beliefs, if injected, are simply ignored
in that process. 100 And under this version of liberal political philosophy,
96. In the United States today, there are more than 1500 different "primary religious organizations"
(i.e., churches, sects, cults, temples, societies, and missions). J. GORDON MELTON, THE ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF AMERICAN RELIGIONS at xix (3d ed. 1989).
97. Francis Canavan, Pluralism and the Limits of Neutrality, in WHOSE VALUES? THE BATrLE FOR
MORALrIY iN PLURALISTIC AMERICA 154 (Carl Horn ed., 1985) [hereinafter WHOSE VALUES?].
98. Id.
99. For an articulation of this liberal ideal m the general context of the Constitution, see Robin
West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641 (1990):
For classical liberals, it is the individual, not the commiinity, who is the Authority on the
nature of the good, nct only with respect to religious beliefs and political ideas (separately
insulated from community control by the first amendment), but also with respect to ways
of life. Consequently, legislation that interferes with such individual authority is strongly
disfavored, and properly subject to constitutional check.
Id. at 663. For an articulation of this liberal ideal in the specific context of the religion clauses, see
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1968) ("Government in our democracy, state and national,
must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine and practice. It may not be hostile to any religion
or to the advocacy of non-religion. The First Amendment mandates government neutrality between
different religions, and between religion and nonreligion.').
Governmental neutrality-and the resultant model of exclusive pluralism-may rest on at least two
alternative premises: (I) "that it is impossible to rank competing views of the good life and thus
impossible to say that one is better than another," or (2) that "even if one way of life can be said to be
better than others, the state must be neutral among them because no actual consensus exists concerning
which way of life is best." Stephen A. Gardbaum, Why the Liberal State Can Promote Moral Ideas After
All, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1350, 1356-57 (1991). For an assessment of these premises, see id. at 1358-70.
100. One way in which religion has been removed (voluntarily and involuntarily) from the public
sphere has been through its "pnvatization"--that is, by its conception as a purely private matter. See
Gerard V Bradley, Dogmatomachy-A "Pnvatization" Theory of the Religion Clause Cases, 30 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 275 (1986); Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 60, at 1584-85, 1599; Myers, supra note 47.
In the First Amendment context, for example, the Supreme Court recently asserted that "[tihe design
of the Constitution is that preservation and transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a
responsibility and a choice committed to the private sphere " Lee v. Weisman, 112 S. Ct. 2649,
2656 (1992); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 625 (1971). This privatization of religious
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one can further appreciate how and why the exclusion of religious claims
from the law-making process might appear justifiable, especially when
those claims may involve inaccessible reasoning, close-minded adherence,
and, most significantly, liberty-restrictive policy implications.'"
As a matter of political philosophy and fundamental fairness, however,
to what degree does this model of neutral government truly reflect or
foster the ideal of "tolerant pluralism"9 Although governmental neutrality
through exclusive pluralism is one answer to the problem of diversity, it
is not the only answer, and arguably it is not the best. For a chief aspect
of exclusive pluralism is, oddly enough, its own intolerance towards
certain world views and models of political participation which differ
from itself, and in this sense it is as value-imposing as the endorsement
of any particular conception of social good. Ironically, exclusive pluralism
thus becomes the very monster it purports to fight, and in place of any
specific conception of social good it potentially "leads to the
establishment of the beliefs of the most secularized, materialistic, and
hedonistic elements of the population as normative."' 2
Not only do exclusive pluralism and so-called government neutrality fail
to eradicate intolerance, they also fail to fully appreciate the meaning of
pluralism. When one focuses solely on the outcomes of law making (and
especially when one has particular outcomes in mind), then of course the
belief, however, not only risks misperceiving the nature of religious belief or faith but may also be
severely alienating to those who are strongly religious. Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 60, at 1599;
Stephen D. Smith, The Restoration of Tolerance, 78 CAL. L. REv. 305, 317 & n.49 (1990).
i01. See, e.g., James Hitchcock, Disentangling the Secular Humanist Debate, in WHOSE VALUES?,
supra note 97, at 21, 34-35 (noting that "orthodox religious believers are often accused of being
absolutists who try to impose their morality on everyone else, or not properly respecting American
pluralism"); see supra part I.B.4.
102. Canavan, supra note 97, at 160. In this vein, Lutheran-turned-Catholic theologian Richard John
Neuhaus has remarked that "[p]luralism is a jealous god. When pluralism is established as dogma, there
is no room for other dogmas. The assertion of other points of reference in moral discourse becomes, by
definition, a violation of pluralism." RICHARD J. NEUHAUS, THE NAKED PUBLIC SQUARE: RELIGION AND
DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 148 (1984).
Like exclusive pluralism, secularism would also seem vulnerable to this kind of Nietzschean fate.
Those who advocate seculansm-which seems, not surprisingly, to be historically and philosoplucally
related to the liberal ethos of exclusive pluralism-precariously straddle the fence between being
indifferent toward, and being hostile toward, religion. As one commentator has observed:
The secularism that arises in a culture out of protest against the excesses and extravaganc-
es of religious zeal and passion can itself become afflicted with this form of
invalidism. Secularism itself may thus become a form of uncontrolled zeal that carries
its own poisonous venon [sic) into the life of the community. Thus, what initially arose
as a sane, disciplined resistance to the folly of religious zeal dissolves into a counter-
movement of zealots, bent on destroying all religion, but in the process, becoming itself
a religion of demonic proportions.
BERNARD E. MELAND, THE SECULARIZATION OF MODERN CULTURES 19 (1966).
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exclusion of certain worldviews or public policy stances seems justifiable.
Yet to focus only on outcomes is to ignore perhaps the most important
aspect of a truly vital pluralism-namely, the opportunity for all citizens
of all philosophical persuasions to participate in the law-making process,
to have their viewpoints considered by lawmakers, and, if ultimately
successful, to have their values reflected in the laws under which they
must live. 0 3 As one pair of commentators notes:
The stability of any liberal democracy depends on a perception of the
people that their law treats everyone more or less equally and does not
affirmatively dictate different results based upon the status of those
that it governs. If the religious people who constitute the majority
of Americans come to believe, as many already do, that the law-making
process does not respect their religious beliefs (at least to the extent
that it respects secular beliefs), then they themselves will neither
respect the process nor the laws that it generates.1
0 4
The model of exclusive pluralism can also be criticized on two other
grounds. First, the exclusion of religion from the law-making process not
only generates its own form of intolerance and denies religious citizens
the opportunity to meaningfully shape public policy, it also sends the
message to these citizens that their beliefs-their sources of ultimate
concern, if you will-do not merit serious consideration. 5 "The
knowledge that the political system rejects an individual's personal
religious experiences as being wholly subjective and irrelevant makes her
103. The exclusive approach likewise fails to appreciate the fact that significant social change often
requires (not simply invites) the injection of competing ideologies or worldviews into the law-making
process, and lawmakers therefore cannot afford to be "neutral" when individuals or groups make
legitimate claims about political or social justice:
The implication [of an exclusive approach] is that pluralism is a system in which diverse
groups voluntarily refrain from pushing their own views too hard, lest they tread on the
toes of their neighbors. In reality, pluralism is precisely the opposite. It is of the essence
of a pluralistic society that, since there is no commonly accepted standard for what is true
or false, every group must push as hard as it can for its own positions. Limits are
imposed on this only by other groups pushing equally hard in the other direction. No
effective social movement of the past quarter century-the civil rights movement
feminism, environmentalism-has been successful by being voluntarily deferential to
other groups.
Hitchcock, supra note 101, at 35; cf. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 324 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
104. Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 60, at 1599-1600. Moreover, a neutrality, outcome-focused
model of pluralism not only deprives certain citizens from participating in the law-maing process but
also largely deprives the process (and thus society) of any real substance. "[T]he liberalism of neutrality
, in other words, "impoverishes the very community that it promises to enrich." Smith, supra note
100, at 329.
105. Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 60, at 1598-99.
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feel separated, illegitimate, and inferior."'' 6  Second and more
significant, the supposed solution to the problem of diversity which
exclusive pluralism purports to bring about is not really a solution at all.
As a practical matter, "secularism has not solved the problem posed by
religion in public life so much as it has buried it. By placing religion on
the far side of the boundary marking the limit of the real world,
secularism prevents public life from taking religion seriously "17 And
in the end, the notion that government can truly be neutral toward
competing conceptions of social good may simply be unrealistic. 0 8 As
one commentator has remarked: "Liberalism-as-tolerance is an admirable
ideal," but "[l]iberalism-as-neutrality is a phantom, a will o' the
wisp. "
109
One obvious alternative to government neutrality and exclusive
pluralism, and an approach which would more readily permit judges and
other lawmakers to advert to religious values, is the model of inclusive
pluralism. Such a model would hold that any and all values and
conceptions of social good are welcome in the law-making arena, and that
judges and other lawmakers should accept or reject them on their merit
and relevance, not on their source or the manner in which they are
held." This "jurisprudence of inclusion"-although certain to yield
outcomes which will not please all citizens-is ultimately more justifiable
than exclusive pluralism to the extent that law making, by acknowledging
the beliefs and values of the citizenry, could be embraced as a politically
legitimate enterprise and to the extent that religion could be respected as
a valid source of moral insight. Judges and other lawmakers may, of
106. Id. at 1599; see also Carter, supra note 2, at 940.
107. Gedicks, supra note 46, at 139 (emphasis in original).
108. Michael J. Perry, A Brief Comment, 63 TUL. L. REv. 1673, 1676-77 (1989) ('IThere is no such
thing as a political justification that does not privilege-that does not presuppose the authority or
superiority of-a conception (or range of conceptions) of human good relative to another such
conception (or range of conceptions).'); see also Joseph M. Boyle, Jr., A Catholic Perspective on
Morality and the Law, I J.L. & RELIGION 227, 233-34 (1983) ("There is no neutral ground on which
legislators, judges or citizens can stand and rationally arbitrate the conflicts between moral perspectives.
Any such ground will in fact be some moral perspective and the illusion that it is neutral will have the
effect of disregarding the moral views of some citizens.'); Francis Canavan, The Pluralist Game, 44 L.
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1981, at 23, 36 (noting that "some view coneering sexual relationships
gets enforced by the power of law. What is impossible is to take no view at all and call it neutrality.").
109. MICHAEL J. PERRY, MOALrlY, POLiTICs, AND LAW 102 (1988).
110. See Gedicks & Hendrix, supra note 60:
So long as they are put forth in terms and on premises that permit a debate about their
general wisdom and usefulness, religiously based arguments that are relevant to resolution
of a public policy issue should not be disqualified from participating in the discussion
solely because of their religious origin or character.
Id. at 1616 (footnote omitted).
[Vol. 68:433
RELIGIOUS VALUES
course, ultimately choose not to advert to religious values when resolving
difficult issues, but to deny them the opportunity to choose at all is
neither neutral nor fair government.
2. Religious Values and Community-Based Law Making
A second relevant strain of political thought, and one which has
increasingly gained an audience among legal and other scholars,"' is
commonly referred to as communitarianism.1 2  Under a particular
communitarian perspective, the judicial use of religious values might be
justified-perhaps even required-as a means to permit citizens to
collectively shape or maintain the "tone of the society""' 3 or to
"maintain a decent society "4 Although this approach to law making
I 11. See, e.g., ALASDAiR MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE (1981); Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics,
and the Claims of Community, 90 MICH. L. REv. 685 (1992); H.N. Hirsch, The Threnody ofLiberalism:
Constitutional Liberty and the Renewal of Community, 14 POL. THEORY 423 (1986); Paul W. Kahn,
Community in Contemporary Constitutional Theory, 99 YALE L.J. 1 (1989).
112. Communitananisin, like "femnsm" and perhaps like "religion" itself, is difficult to define, in
part because several different camps-from neo-republicanism to critical legal studies-have invoked
communitanan ideas, and in part because communitanamsm would seem to be more of a broad, after-
the-fact label than a singular, discemable philosophical position. See Gardbaum, supra note 11. Of
some help is a "platform" generated by a "communitanan teach-in" in the fall of 1991 in Washington,
D.C., which is in effect a manifesto of communitarian values. See The Responsive Communitanan
Plaform: Rights & Responsibilities, 2 RESPONSIVE COMMUNITY: RT. & RESP., Winter 1991-92, at 4.
As used in this Note, the idea of communitaranism would encompass the right of citizens to collectively
shape, to varying degrees through every legal institution, the nature of their social, political, and
economic environment. Accordingly, to the extent that the judiciary is unable to respond to the
religiously inspired values of citizens who in large part comprise the civil community, then the notion
of community is itself offended.
113. This phrase derives from Alexander M. Bickel, On Pornography: Dissenting and Concurring
Opinions, 22 PuB. INTEREST, Winter 1971, at 25, 25-26, and possibly from Louis Henkin, Morals and
the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 391, 395 (1963), and has been employed
by the Supreme Court in its treatment of obscenity. E.g., Pans Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,
59 (1973). This Note's invocation of Professor Bickel should not suggest that Bickel had in mind the
judicial use of religious values as a means of maintaining the societal tone; indeed, the invocation is
somewhat ironic, since he apparently did not think highly of religion in the public square. See NEUHAUS,
supra note 102, at 81; Michael E. Smith, The Special Place of Religion in the Constitution, 1983 SLIP.
CT. REV. 83, 112.
114. Chief Justice Warren introduced this phrase while dissenting in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184
(1964) (holding that a film, possessed and exhibited by the criminal defendant, was not legally obscene
under the First Amendment), although he may have derived it from Henkin, supra note 113, at 394. In
relevant part, Warren stated:
In this and other cases in this area of the law, which are coming to us in ever-increasing
numbers, we are faced with the resolution of rights basic both to individuals and to
society as a whole. Specifically, we are called upon to reconcile the right of the Nation
and of the States to maintain a decent society and, on the other hand, the right of
individuals to express themselves freely in accordance with the guarantees of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments.
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may be readily criticized as paternalistic, or as simply a means of
effecting a tyranny of the majority, it is hard to deny that communities
ought to be able to influence the nature of law, at least to a point." 5
Of course, the right of a community to influence judicial decision
making-or, in turn, the propriety of a judge adverting to a community's
values-may be more complicated than the role of community values in
legislative decision making, especially where the judiciary is not designed
to. be, or does not purport to be, necessarily subject to democratic or
majoritarian influence." 6 Nevertheless, judicial decision making cannot
and should never be absolutely severed from societal context, perhaps
especially in hard cases. Indeed, to prohibit a judge from hearing the
voices of religious citizens as she decides what are in essence religious
questions is to sever a relevant community from the collective dialogue
of law making and thus to render that law making both less informed and
potentially less legitimate to the community 17 Such a complete
severance, in fact, may not only give rise to, and in some cases may
maximize, the so-called "counter-majoritarian difficulty,"".. but also
leaves judges in the difficult, dangerous, and potentially untenable
position of resolving cases on largely personal or nonsocietal grounds.
C. The Utilitarian Perspective
In addition to being historically and philosophically justifiable, the
inclusion of religion in the law-making process is also justifiable as a
Id. at 199 (Warren, C.J., dissenting). As with the Bickel quote, there is no indication that Warren
contemplated the judicial use of religious values as one means of maintaining a decent society (although,
unlike Bickel, there is no obvious indication to the contrary).
115. Of course, where or what this "point" ought to be is one of the central, enduring debates in
political and constitutional theory. Some theorists have argued that the judiciary may properly intervene
in otherwise majoritanan-democratic law making in cases where the political processes have been, or
perhaps have become, inaccessible to or unrepresentative of certain subsets of society. See, e.g., JOHN
H. ELY, DEMocRAcY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REvIEw (1980). Other theorists argue that
as far as rights are concerned, the political process is largely irrelevant, and the judiciary either may or
must intervene whenever law making impinges on a certain body of fundamental rights or fundamental
values. For a critical discussion of this approach, see John H. Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977
Term-Foreword: On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARV. L. REV. 5 (1978).
116. See generally Wojciech Sadurski, Conventional Morality and Judicial Standards, 73 VA. L.
REV. 339 (1987).
117. See also infra text accompanying notes 120-23.
118. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962). "The root
difficulty" with the power ofjudicial review, observed Bickel, is that it "is a counter-majoritarian force
in our system [W]hen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act or the action
of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and now;
it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it." Id. at 16-17.
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matter of social value or utility ... The use of religious values in
judicial law making can yield benefits both to the substance and
legitimacy of judicial decisions and to the society which must live in the
context of judge-made law
First, religion may endow the law with a unique sense of legitimacy, at
least from the perspective of the governed. To be sure, a
feeling that law is in some way rooted in religion, and can appeal to
a divine or semi-divine sanction for its validity, clearly accounts to a
considerable degree for that aura of authority which law is able to
command and more particularly for the belief in the moral duty to
obey the law. 20
Accordingly, when the law is divorced from religion-when meaningful
religious participation in the law-making process is absent-the legal
system may be seen by many as illegitimate.
The radical separation of law and religion in twentieth century
American thought, in the sphere [of] jurisprudence and legal
philosophy, creates a serious danger that law will not be respected. If
law is to be measured only by standards of experience, or workability,
and not by standards of truth or rightness, then it will be difficult to
enforce it against those who think it does not serve their interests. 2'
In fact, if the law-making process becomes too secularized and creates too
serious a sense of disenfranchisement among religious citizens, then social
order itself-a supposed goal of the law-may be undermined. 22 In
119. As used in this Part, the terms "utility" and "utilitarian" are meant simply to convey the notion
of usefulness or functional value and should not necessarily be construed as expressions of the political-
economic philosophy of Jeremy Bentham or John Stuart Mill. Of course, invoking that latter meaning
of utilitarianism to support judicial reliance on religious values might be possible, and, for those so
inclined, this Part could be seen as a partial list of benefits which could then be factored into an
essentially utilitarian cost-benefit analysis. Cf. John Stuart Mill, Utility of Religion, in NATURE and
UTILITY OF RELIGION (George Nakhmikian ed., Bobbs-Merrill Co. 1958) (1858).
120. DENNIs LLOYD, THE IDEA OF LAW 47 (1964); see also BERMAN, supra note 1, at 24-25
("[E]ven in those societies which make a sharp distinction between law and religion, the two need each
other-law to give religion its social dimension and religion to give law its spirit and direction as well
as the sanctity it needs to command respect").
There are persuasive arguments, of course, that the legitimacy of law does not or should not derive
from its embodiment of the moral-religious values of the community. See STANLEY I. BENN & RICHARD
S. PETERS, THE PRINCIPLEs OF POLmCAL THOUGHT 67-82 (1959). Accordingly, to the extent that one
rejects the notion that the law's legitimacy derives, in part or in whole, from its inclusion of the
community's moral-religious values, then certainly tis first factor would hardly be persuasive.
121. Berman, Law and Religion, supra note 72, at 409; see also NEUHAUS, supra note 102, at 259
("T]here is nothing in store but a continuing and deepening crisis of legitimacy if courts persist in
systematically ruling out of order the moral traditions in which Western law has developed and which
bear, for the overwhelming majority of the American people, a living sense of right and wrong.").
122. Gedicks, supra note 46, at 139 (arguing that the exclusion of religion from public life,
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short, the interaction of law and religion may not simply be prudent but
may be necessary, for the sake of both law and religion.'
Second, religion can provide the law (and society) with a conceptual
framework in which complex philosophical ideas such as freedom or
social justice can more deeply be understood. 2 4  Pre-Civil War
abolitionism, the early twentieth century social gospel movement, and the
civil rights movement, for example, can all be traced to a religiously
informed understanding about the meaning of justice and to "a
commitment to ideas that could not be lived out freely in any of the
existing frameworks of shared meaning."'12 5 And religion's ability to
enhance the law's appreciation of important public policy questions may
result not only from the ideas, values, and world views embraced by
various religious traditions but also from the "rich, polyvalent symbolic
power" which is inherent in, and often unique to, religious language and
discourse. 26
Third, because many religions are grounded in long, often thoughtful
traditions, and because religion is often oriented toward forces or ends
essentially by ignoring religious persons and their views, "can remain stable only so long as those who
are ignored acquiesce to their social situation"); see also FREDERICK M. GEDICKs & ROGER HENDRIX,
CHOOSING THE DREAM: THE FUTURE OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE (1991).
123. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 25 (arguing that "where (law and religion] are divorced from each
other, law tends to degenerate into legalism and religion into religiosity").
124. Robin W Lovin, Religion and American Public Life: Three Relationships, in RELIGION AND
AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 7 (Robin W. Lovin ed., 1986); Myers, supra note 47, at 24 ("[A]ccepting a
public role for religion enables religious institutions to contribute significant resources and insights
regarding moral issues.'); Developments in the Law-Religion and the State, 100 HARv. L. REV. 1606,
1618-19 (1987); cf Jeremy Rabkin, Disestablished Religion in America, 86 PUB. INTEREST, Dec. 1987,
at 124:
The greatest contribution of religion to our constitutional order might be the one that
figured so largely in the original arguments for limited government: Religion may put
political and legal disputes in better perspective by reminding us that, in the end, our
souls can neither be saved nor lost by mere governments.
Id. at 138.
125. Lovin, supra note 124, at 18-19. This is not to deny that religious thinking can be, and in the
past has been, a source of ideas and practices which are antithetical to contemporary notions of human
dignity or social justice:
[The] correlation of the culture's religious history with the ultimate dignity of man is by
no means unambiguous. Instances to the contrary can readily be cited, such as the
attempts to give biblical justifications of human slavery among certain Southern
churchmen; or the overt enslavement of human beings as factory workers among pious
Northern industrialists prior to the rise of trade unions in the United States. But the
discrepancies, along with their own distinctive disclosures of depravity, stand repudiated
by the more sensitive and prophetic legacy of this religious history, which, one may say,
has been the more enduring, if not always the more pervasive, form of its witness.
MELAND, supra note 102, at 20.
126. See JOHN A. COLEMAN, AN AMERICAN STRATEGIC THEOLOGY 193-94 (1982).
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which transcend society (particularly society's immediate temporal
framework), religion can serve both as a counterweight to new or
temporary shifts in societal attitudes or desires as well as a relatively
objective measure against which such shifts can be evaluated. 12 7
Ironically, it may be precisely because of this dissentient dimension of
religion that some persons find religious participation in public life to be
of low utility, particularly in a dynamic, progressive society such as the
United States. One need only look to recent history, however, to realize
that religious organizations ultimately fail society not when they are
antagonistic to political and social developments but when they acquiesce
to them in the name of deference and institutional civility
[I]t must be remembered that religion is almost always accorded
recognition and even the blessing of the state . as long as religion
supports the national interests and public policies of the state, as in the
Third Reich or the most atheistic socialist countries today Religion
may be tolerated and even patronized in the totalitarian state as long
as religion assumes a subservient role It is only when the
prophetic role of religion that is exercised calls into question the
declared interests and policies of the state, that the right of
communities of faith to be involved in society is most likely to be
challenged and even denounced by the state, whether communist or
democratic. 2 '
Fourth, because of its broad sense of history and continuity and its
focus on the transcendent, religion also has the potential to be forward-
127. See MuRRAY S. STEDMAN, JR., RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA 18-19 (1964) (asserting
that religious bodies-by virtue of their acute sense of moral awareness, history, and continuity-are
in a unique position to evaluate and pass judgment on significant public and political issues); Hyde,
supra note 64, at 44; George Weigel, Catholicism and the American Proposition, FIRST THINGS, May
1992, at 38, 39-40 (arguing that, among other things, the "self-consciously transcultural and
transhistorical" nature of modem Catholic social teaching make it a particularly apt resource for the
ongoing debate about the future of American society); Peter L. Berger, The First Freedom,
COMMENTARY, Dec. 1988, at 64:
[Tihe most important secular purpose any church can serve is to remind people that there
is a meaning to human existence that transcends all worldly agendas, that all human
institutions (including the nation-state) are only relatively important, and that all worldly
authority-even that of the Supreme Court of the United States-is disclosed as comically
irrelevant in the perspective of transcendence.
Id. at 65.
128. James E. Wood, Jr., The Prophetic Role ofReligion in Society, 30 J. CHURCH & ST. 219, 225
(1988). For a partial account of the dynamics, for better and for worse, of the Christian churches during
the rise of the Third Reich, see Franklin H. Littell, From Barmen (1934) to Stuttgart (1945): The Path
of the Confessing Church in Germany, in READINGS ON CHURCH AND STATE 281 (James E. Wood, Jr.
ed., 1989). Littell notes that those religious leaders who systematically refused to pledge their support
to Hitler and the state were, ironically, severely attacked for "meddling in politics." Id. at 285.
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looking and to provide the law with moral and political vision.'29 While
both law and religion are very much rooted in tradition and significantly
oriented towards what has already been, 3 °  each is-and must
be-equally oriented towards the changing needs of society and towards
what is yet to come. This may be particularly true today, where judges
and other lawmakers continue to confront new and increasingly complex
questions about ultimate human value and purpose. Accordingly, religious
vision can "provide an account of the whole in which to test the larger
meaning and purpose of the decisions we make at any particular historical
moment."'' Religion, in other words, "challenges law not only on the
level of duty but also, and primarily, on the level of aspiration.' ' 32
Finally, even if religious values as such are not directly employed in a
judge's decision making, a judge's ability to evaluate relevant history and
precedent case law from a theological perspective may itself be a source
of valuable and unique insight."3 3 Indeed, because American law and
society are so much the product of Judeo-Christian ethical and
philosophical thought, it should seem quite unconscionable that judges
129. See THOMAS, supra note 15:
It can be shown that religion in its highest form has raised morality to a higher level.
For example, the "dynamic religion" of Western ethical monotheism has inspired men
with the vision of a world community and has awakened a desire to overcome the forces
that separate different classes, races, and nations and set them in opposition to each other.
Based upon the belief that all men have been created by God and should love one another
as brothers, this vision has made men aware that they have obligations not only to those
of their own society but also to all mankind. Thus, while what [Henri] Bergson called
"static religion" has usually been content to provide a divine source and sanction for the
conservative social morality of a "closed society," "dynamic religion" has been one of the
most powerful forces behind the creative morality that leads towards an "open society"
of all mankind.
Id. at 60-61 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). This point may obviously be connected to the
earlier point, supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text, concerning religion's capacity to provide
citizens with a conceptual framework in which certain ideas, such as freedom or social justice, can be
more thoroughly and deeply understood.
130. See BERMAN, supra note I, at 34.
13 1. James M. Childs, Jr., Religion and Politics: Tradition and the Post-Modern Agenda: A Response
to Professor Frederick Gedicks, 20 CAP. U. L. REV. 147, 157 (1991).
132. BERMAN, supra note 1, at 135.
133. See generally Fort, supra note 73 (advocating a theologically-informed approach to
jurisprudence); MILNER S. BALL, THE PROMISE OF AMERICAN LAW: A THEOLOGICAL, HUMANISTIC
VIEW OF LEGAL PROCESS (1981). In large part, Professor Ball's thesis is that "the biblical tradition is
the most fruitful medium for understanding, judging, and celebrating the secular world, including law
[and] that a theological standpoint will provide a view of law in context and in relation to other
human enterprises." Id. at 2; see also Mulford Q. Sibley, Religion and Law: Some Thoughts on Their
Intersections, 2 J.L. & RELIGION 41 (1984); Samuel E. Stumpf, Theology and Jurisprudence, 40
CHRISTIAN SCHOLAR 169 (1957).
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(and lawyers) might engage in the great task of law making without some
sense or understanding of the law's religious roots and meaning.
13 4
D The Empirical Perspective
One final perspective on the role of religious values in the judicial
decision-making process is empirical in nature, and examines the issue in
light of what is actually happening in that process. This Note argues that
religious values are already informing judicial decision making, and that
their use is and will continue to be inevitable. Accordingly, the better
course might be simply to acknowledge and accept the judicial use of
religious values, thereby leading to a higher degree of accountability and,
hopefully, an improvement in the manner in which they are used. The
concern, in other words, should not be over whether or not religious
values are being used, but rather how well or properly judges are in fact
using them.
Although the position that judges are inevitably using religious values
may be controversial, it is arguably more realistic than the counterpremise
that they are not. Initially, if one accepts the earlier assertion that claims
which address the so-called big questions of human existence are
inherently religious in nature,' then it necessarily follows that judges
must think religiously when they decide cases that involve such questions.
In resolving substantive due process cases arising under the Fourteenth
Amendment, for example, the Supreme Court has addressed such
fundamental questions as the status of a human fetus (and the status of the
act of abortion),'3 6 the status of a human being in a persistent vegetative
134. A judge's capacity to appreciate the religious background (among other backgrounds) of law
could be especially necessary where that judge is attempting to interpret a rule or principle in light of
original intent or historical context. See Terence Ball, Constitutional Interpretation and Conceptual
Change, in LEGAL HERMENEuriTCS: HISTORY, THEORY, AND PRACrICE 129, 131 (Gregory Leyh ed.,
1992) (noting that "[t]o correctly characterize an author's text requires that one be able to
identify the world picture that informs the language within which his or her intentions are (or were)
framed in the first place").
135. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
136. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that there is a constitutional right to undergo an
abortion, limitable by states only in the third and possibly second trimesters). The Court's claim that
it did not need to "resolve the difficult question of when life begins," id. at 159, hardly renders its
decision making less philosophical or religious. In a world where scientific data will not resolve the
issue of defining the moral boundaries of human life, an assertion that one does not or cannot know
those boundaries is arguably as much a philosophical or religious claim as an assertion that human life
begins at any particular temporal-spatial point.
For two recent and quite interesting statements of the position that religious values should inform the
legal dialogue over abortion, see Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology, and Abortion: Toward Love,
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state, (and the status of the act of removing life-sustaining treatment), 37
and the status of the act of homosexual sodomy. 3 ' One may choose to call
these issues any number of things: legal questions, moral questions, social
questions, or questions of the greatest philosophical moment. But by
addressing such issues, the Justices must have included in their analyses
religious values, since all of them invariably require determinations about
the nature and telos of the human being, including what constitutes full
human value for the purposes of birth, life, and death.
Even if one were to confine the term "religious" solely to claims which
emerge from persons or institutions which practice or advocate traditional
religion, then one must still conclude that many judges, albeit fewer, are
thinking religiously or adverting to religious values when deciding cases.
First, the mere fact that judges are operating in a legal system which has
deep theological roots will lead them to render decisions which
necessarily implicate religious values, even if those religious values were
incorporated into the law at a much earlier date and the legal system has
since become, or is perceived to be, secular in nature.'3 9 Second, when
a judge relies, as she often must, on the moral tone or values of the
ambient society, 40 once again she will likely be relying ultimately on
religious values, since society's moral values often stem from or reflect
Compassion, and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REv. I011 (1989), and Elizabeth Mensch & Alan Freeman, The
Politics of Virtue: Animals, Theology, and Abortion, 25 GA. L. REv. 923 (1991).
137. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (suggesting that there is a
limited constitutional right to refuse life-sustaimng or life-saving medical treatment).
138. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that there is no constitutional right to
engage in homosexual sodomy). For an analysis of Bowers, see supra text accompanying notes 68-70
and mfra notes 164-69 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., John K. Bleimaier, A Christian Jurisprudence, 30 CATH. LAW. 48 (1985):
Temporal society, of necessity a creature of laws, is shaped by the religious influences
that shape the individual members of society. Therefore the presence of Christians within
society, and the general dissemination of Christian ideas among the populous [sic], even
among those not possessed of Christian faith, has had dramatic impact on the evolution
of western jurisprudence.
Id. at 50.
140. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 240; see also Katrys, supra note 2:
If legal reasoning does not provide the source for results, what does? The results come
from those same political, social, moral, and religious value judgments from which the
law purports to be independent. The ultimate basis for a decision is a social and
political judgment incorporating a variety of factors, including the context of the case, the
parties, and the substance of the issues.
Id. at 247. In fact, judicial decision making may entail an even more sophisticated level of meta-ethical
analysis, since "[j]udicial decision, especially on matters of high constitutional import, often involves
a choice between moral values, and not merely the application of some single outstanding moral
principle "H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 200 (1961).
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religious ethical thought.' 4 ' Third, where the judge herself is religious
in a traditional or formal sense, then the likelihood of reliance on
religious values is also substantial, even if the judge claims or believes
that she is not relying on her own convictions. 42 As one commentator
has noted:
[T]he liberal insistence that judges and other government officials place
religious conviction entirely to one side plainly misconceives the nature
of faith. Religious faith is not something that can be shrugged off like
an unattractive article of clothing. The very idea of devotion suggests
a way of ordering all life and all knowledge, including, although not
exclusively, moral knowledge.
43
Indeed, it may be that judges are selected for office precisely because of
their ability to make acceptable judgments informed by their moral,
political, and religious preferences, even if these preferences are not
explicitly revealed in judges' actual decisions. 144
As a practical matter, speculation about judicial psychology may be
unnecessary, since one can find numerous examples of cases in which
judges actually refer to religious values in their reasoning. Explicit
judicial recourse to religious values can be found, for example, in cases
involving the Fifth Amendment right to remain silent and not have that
silence used against oneself, 145  the question of whether sexual
intercourse is an inherent right of marriage, 46 the constitutionality of
141. See BERMAN, supra note 1, at 135, 174 n.1; TIMOTHY L. FORT, LAW AND RELIGION 113-14
(1987); LYONS, supra note 32, at 10 (noting that "[a] theological conception of the foundation for moral
judgments is still widely accepted" and "is shared not only by many who believe in the existence of a
God but also by many who deny or doubt that a God exists").
142. One commentator has bluntly summed up the matter as follows:
We must deal with the fact that, regardless of what the norm of official behavior is,
public officials will take their own religious convictions into account in performing their
official duties. They may not always do so, but it is absurd to suppose that they have
never done so with some frequency, that they do not now do so with some frequency, and
that they will not always do so with some frequency.
Schauer, supra note 36, at 1083. But see ROBERT A. CARP & RONALD STIDHAM, JUDICIAL PROCESS IN
AMERICA 267, 293 n.21 (1990) (reporting that "background variables 'such as religion, socio-economic
ongins, education, and age were found to be almost entirely unrelated to voting behavior") (quoting
Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1961-64, 60 AM. POL. SCI.
REv. 379, 382 (1966)).
143. Carter, supra note 2, at 940.
144. William E. Nelson, History and Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, 72 VA. L. REv. 1237,
1251 (1986).
145. People v. Bobo, 212 N.W.2d 190, 194 (Mich. 1973) (acknowledging that "[t]his humane rule
has higher sanction than mere judicial precedene' and then referrng to the trial of Jesus before the
Sanhendnn, as recorded in Matthew 26:57-68) (quoting State v. Hogan, 252 S.W. 387 (Mo. 1923)).
146. Cox v. Cox, 493 S.W.2d 371, 373 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973) (noting that "[this right is sanctioned
by the Judeo-Christian ethic" and citing Genesis and Mark).
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a statute prohibiting sodomy,'4 7 the validity of a statute prohibiting
public nudity, 41 the right of one spouse to act as conservator of the
other spouse, 149  the conversion of property, 50  child visitation
rights,'15  child custody rights, 152 criminal sentencing for child sexual
abuse, 53  criminal sentencing for murder,5 4  the propriety of state
147. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concumng) (asserting that
condemnation of sodomy "is firmly rooted in Judeao-Chnstian [sic] moral and ethical standards");
Commonwealth v. Wasson, No. 90-SC-558-TG, 1992 Ky. LEXIS 140, at *56-57 & n.1 (Ky. Sept. 24,
1992) (Lambert, J., dissenting) (citing Leviticus and Romans as well as Chief Justice Burger's reference
in Bowers to the Judeo-Chnstian tradition). Lest the reader think that religious values are consistently
used to uphold orjustify anti-sodomy statutes, it should be noted that the trial court in Wasson received
testimony against the statute from a Presbyterian minister, see id. at "6, and the Supreme Court of
Kentucky received amicus briefs against the statute from numerous religious organizations. See id. at
"8 & n.l.
148. People v. David, 549 N.Y.S.2d 564, 567-68 (N.Y. City Ct. 1989) (citing "Judeo-Christian
teachings," including Genesis, as a way to justify and understand the statutory prohibition on public
nudity), rev'd, 585 N.Y.S.2d 149 (N.Y. Co. Ct. 1991).
149. In re Siveke, 441 N.Y.S.2d 631, 634 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981) ("[T]he proposition that the
relationship of husband and wife is special and unique finds support in scripture as well, wherein we
are told, 'Therefore a man leaves his father and mother and cleaves to his wife, and they become one
flesh.' (Book of Genesis, Chapter 2, Verse 24).).
150. Wells Fargo Bank Int'l v. Binabdulaziz, 478 N.Y.S.2d 580, 581 (N.Y. Sup. Ct 1984) ("The
answer lies in recalling that historical canon long recogmzed m the Judeo-Christian tradition of our
system of justice that he who finds and keeps property he knows belongs to another must restore the
property involved (Leviticus 6:4).).
151. Chicome v. Chicome, 479 N.W.2d 891, 897 (S.D. 1992) (Henderson, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (asserting that the "Bible decries" homosexuality, the sexual orientation of the mother
seeking visitation rights). The manner in which religious values are used in this case-as a way to
evaluate the morality of the mother's conduct or lifestyle-is not the manner in which religious values
are often used in child custody and visitation cases, in which a parent's own religious beliefs are
factored into the decision. See infra note 187.
152. In re Shotwell, No. CA 6189, 1983 WL 5642, at "2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 6, 1983) (asserting that
"[l]egitimate efforts at establishing guidelines for resolution of custodial conflicts needf] [to] be
focus[ed] upon basic Judeo-Chnstain [sic] principles of family"). As in Chicoine, the manner in which
religious values are used in this case-as a way to provide a moral context in which to resolve the
custodial dispute-is again not the usual function of religious values in child custody cases.
153. People v. Jagnjic, 447 N.Y.S.2d 439 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (Lupiano, J., dissenting):
The condemnation of crimes against the young is deeply ingrained in the ethical and
moral history of western civilization. Indeed, the [B]ible is replete with references to this
universal condemnation as, for example, the following scriptural passage concerming
children---"Whosoever shall offend one of these little ones it were better that a
millstone were hanged about his neck, and that he were drowned in the depth of the sea"
(Matthew 18:6). History, philosophy and religion teach us that human nature is not
perfect and that justice demands a balance in her scales.
Id. at 443-44.
154. People v. Yocus, 436 N.Y.S.2d 1002 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (O'Connor, J., dissenting):
Our entire Judeo-Christian concept of civilization is founded on the basic tenet that we
are all possessed of a free will and that we can, within limits, pick and choose our goals
and our way of life. Society must, at all costs, be protected and preserved and its
predators and transgressors must be swiftly made to realize the error and the evil of their
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termination of parental rights,"' and a lawyer's ethical and professional
responsibility to his client. s6 The purpose of citing these cases is not
necessarily to endorse their use of religious values; it is merely to
illustrate that, despite the law's supposed indifference to religion, the use
of religious values remains an indelible aspect of the judicial law making
process."'
From an empirical perspective, then, emerges a picture of judging in
which religious values are already informing judicial decision making,
despite the seemingly secular nature of the process. In turn, this suggests
that the removal of religion from the legal arena has not created a shift
from law making partially informed by religion to law making totally
informed by secular sources; rather, the transformation has been largely
cosmetic, one in which religion has simply been removed from sight.'
ways. But the penalty imposed should never be so devastating as to stifle repentance or
destroy all hope of redemption.
Id. at 1004.
155. In re S.L. and L.L., 419 N.W.2d 689, 697-98 (S.D. 1988) (Henderson, J., dissenting) (asserting
that "children are entrusted to parents as part of God's great plan" and that "the Law should be ever so
cautious in interfering with that edict" and citing numerous passages from the Old and New Testaments);
In re J.Z., 423 N.W.2d 813, 817 (S.D. 1988) (Henderson, J., dissenting).
156. People v. Williams, 538 N.E.2d 564 (Il1. App. Ct. 1989) (Pincham, J., dissenting), aft'd, 563
N.E.2d 431 (11. 1990), cert. denied, 1l S. Ct. 1630 (1991). In reference to a lawyer's responsibility
to his client, Justice Pincham remarks that:
Civilization's most sacred, learned, dedicated and staunchest advocate of all times,
centuries ago, admonished:
"No one can serve two masters; for either he will hate the one and love the
other, or he will hold to the one and despise the other."
The advocate was the Christ Jesus; the admonition was to his disciples and the multitude
during His Sermon on the Mount; the admonition is cited in the most dynamic, accurate
and prestigious of all law books, The Holy Bible, at Matthews the 6th Chapter and the
24th Verse.
Id. at 569.
157. That a majority of these citations, supra notes 145-56, are to concurring or dissenting opinions,
and not to majority opinions, is precisely what one would expect to find. In separate opinions, individual
judges are freer to express what they are actually thinking, and thus one would expect to find religious
values coming out of the closet, so to speak, when judges are writing separately.
158. Take, for example, the recent case of North Carolina Civil Liberties Union v. Constangy, 947
F.2d 1145 (4th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3027 (1992). In Constangy, the Fourth Circuit
invalidated under the Establishment Clause a state judge's practice of beginning each court session with
a prayer of his own creation. There is little doubt that under current Establishment Clause doctrine the
prayer should have been invalidated, and from that perspective the outcome is not problematic.
However, what exactly is the outcome? True, other attendants of his courtroom will no longer have to
listen to his personal prayer, and perhaps this is desirable (especially where certain attendants, such as
criminal defendants, are not voluntarily before the judge). But as far as Judge Constangy's decision
making-presumably the greatest potential source of actual establishment-it will surely continue to be
informed by his own religious beliefs and values. And the real outcome, therefore, is simply the
cosmetic removal of religion from sight, a politically palatable but almost entirely hollow form of
disestablishment.
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And the real shift, therefore, has been from a law making explicitly
informed by religion to a law making covertly informed by reli-
gioniS-a result which warrants not only reexamination, but possibly
rejection as well. 6 '
III. LIMITS ON THE USE OF RELIGIOUS VALUES
IN JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING
This Note clearly envisions and advocates a role for religious values in
judicial decision making. There should be limits on that role, however,
some of which are similar to the limits placed on other sources of input
and some of which may be unique to the nature of religious values.
A. Distinguishing Proper from Improper Uses of Religious
Values
As a practical matter, the use of religious values should be limited by
the same prudential standards which limit a judge's use of other sources
of insight, such as history or tradition, the social sciences, or the physical
sciences. Because history or historical analysis, for example, can be easily
manipulated by judges, one must draw a line between the proper and
improper use of history i6i Likewise, because religious values can be
159. Cf MELAND, supra note 102, at 24-25. Professor Meland argues that, despite the secular state's
desire to disassociate its decisions and policies from religious considerations, influences, or
representations,
the mores of the faith, or the ethos of its tradition and history, are not necessarily
excluded from the exercise of government. Although these mores may not rise to the
surface as overt arguments or principles in the deliberations of a political assembly, they
are very apt to be present and pervasive in the presuppositions, sentiments, and objectives
that motivate and direct such deliberations.
Id.
160. One reason, and perhaps the only plausible reason, why covertness about the use of religious
values in law making should be desired is that it makes law making seem more palatable or politically
legitimate to groups who are offended by the explicit recognition or endorsement of religion by
government. Such groups might include the nonreligious, the non-mainstream religious, or the
mainstream religious who favor strict separation of government and religion. To be sure, this kind of
concern is probably what undergirds a nonendorsement or nonalienation approach to the Establishment
Clause. Yet, to invoke that clause as a means of prohibiting governmental recognition of religion is
simply to beg the question (or is at most an exercise in sterile formalism), since the government engages
in all sorts of activities which offend various individuals or groups. The government apparently finds
it unnecessary, for example, to be covert when dealing in other areas such as foreign policy or
economics even though some persons are quite offended by the government's recognition of one or
more positions effectively at the exclusion of others. For a further discussion of this point, see Smith,
supra note 88, at 211.
161. See, e.g., John P Stevens, A Judge's Use of History, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 223, 230-35 (discussing
the use of Western and constitutional history in the cr&che case of Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668
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determined, filtered, and employed by judges in many different ways, one
must also draw a line between their proper and improper use.
To "properly" use religious values, then, judges should undertake at
least the following three inquiries. Any religious claim, first of all, must
be evaluated in its original and historical contexts. How did the religious
claim come about, what kind of theological premises gave rise to it, and
how has it evolved since its original formulation? Has active euthanasia,
for example, always been proscribed by religious denominations, and, if
so, has the reasoning changed over time? Second, any religious claim must
be evaluated in its contemporary context. How and why do its
contemporary adherents construe the religious claim in question? Are
there differing constructions or rationales behind the claim? Third, judges
must take account of religious claims which contradict the claim in
question, especially if those competing claims arise from within the same
religious tradition. 62 In summary, a judge's evaluation of a religious
value or assertion should conform to a thorough and balanced analysis,
not unlike a judge's evaluation of any other source of insight. 63
(1984)); Douglas Laycock, Text, Intent, and the Religion Clauses, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHics & PUB.
POL'Y 683, 683 (1989). See generally CHARLES A. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF
HISTORY (1969); Donald P. Boyle, Jr., Note, Philosophy, History, and Judging, 30 WM. & MARY L.
REv. 181 (1988). One would like to believe, for example, that a judge's historical analysis would be
accurate, both in terms of what it includes and what it omits, or that ajudge's use of social or physical
scientific data or theories would be improper if it failed to advert to available competing data sets and
theories. These are ideal standards, of course, and it would not be difficult to show that they are seldom
met by judges-the Supreme Court's Everson decision, discussed supra note 85, provides a rich
illustration.
162. One may rightly ask what value it would be to a judge if there were competing viewpoints
within the same religious tradition, or if various religious traditions were in tension with each other on
a particular issue. As a practical matter, other sources which inform judicial decision making (e.g.,
economics or history) frequently offer judges conflicting data or conclusions, and thus the simple answer
is that religious values in conflict with each other are of the same value as other internally-conflicting
sources. A more thoughtful response might be that where religious values or traditions are seriously in
tension with each other, then one may question whether the judiciary should address the issue at
all-that is, whether the courtroom is really the appropriate forum. Precisely because there may appear
to be no clear resolution to a dispute, perhaps such matters are best addressed by the legislature, where
pluralistic compromise may be more naturally achieved. Of course, into which legal institution or branch
such matters ought to be placed is ultimately a political-philosophical, and not simply a logical, issue.
163. Prudence will likely have to be employed not only in a court's analysis, but also in a court's
decision to entertain religious arguments in the first place. Notwithstanding free exercise concerns, one
may suppose that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals employed this kind of prudence when it heard the
pro se appeal of one Leonard Svee, who was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while his license
was revoked:
Some of the arguments raised in the trial court and ostensibly on appeal are incomprehen-
sible and summarily rejected. Among these is that a gold-fringed flag displayed in the
courtroom suggests that the court was limited to admiralty jurisdiction; that Svee is an
ambassador of the Supreme Law Giver with diplomatic immunity, and that the common
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For the purpose of illustration, former Chief Justice Burger's
concurrence in Bowers v Hardwick164 can be considered an improper
use of religious values. At issue was the constitutionality of Georgia's
criminal anti-sodomy statute as applied to male homosexual sodomy
Expanding on his opening claim that "proscriptions against sodomy have
very 'ancient roots," 1 65 Burger asserts that "[c]ondemnation of those
practices is firmly rooted in Judeao-Christian [sic] moral and ethical
standards."' 166 What is problematic here is not Burger's reliance on
historical evidence or religious tradition per se, but rather his
mischaracterization and resultant misuse of these factors. 67 Without
doubt, Burger's approach to religious tradition and values is distortingly
selective and wholly fails to appreciate the theological underpinnings of
the Jewish or Christian tradition. As a matter of historical context, for
example, Burger ignores the fact that sexual acts between men were
openly tolerated by the Christian church during the early Middle
Ages. 68 As a matter of both original and contemporary context,
moreover, he does not explain why the act of sodomy does not comport
with Jewish or Christian morality Finally, he fails to acknowledge
contemporary disagreement within the Jewish and Christian communities
about the moral-theological status of homosexual sodomy 169 In short,
Burger's concurring opinion is not flawed because it employed religious
law as set forth in the Bible forbids that he make treaties with heathens; that the
thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth amendments are unlawful departures of organic
constitutional principles; and that as a free white male he has an unlimited right to use
the highways without restriction.
State v. Svee, No. 87-1586-CR, 1988 Wis. App. LEXIS 43, at 1 (Wis. Ct. App. Jan. 12, 1988), later
proceeding, No. 87-141 i-CR, 1988 Wis. App. LEXIS 45 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 1988), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 838 (1988).
164. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
165. Id. at 196.
166. Id.
167. For example, both Burger's and the majority's versions of history are unjustifiably selective,
and thus improper, in failing to note that "[o]ver the course of Western history, sexual practices between
men, like other sexual practices, have been tolerated as well as condemned." Goldstein, supra note 70,
at 1086; see also Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV.
187, 197 ("In the first centuries of Christianity, as in the ancient Greek and Roman cultures in which
it first took root, homosexuality was common and widely tolerated.").
168. Goldstein, supra note 70, at 1087.
169. See generally JOHN R. BOSWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SOCIAL TOLERANCE, AND HOMOSEXUALITY
(1981); GEORGE EDWARDS, GAY/LESBIAN LIBERATION: A BIBLICAL PERSPECTIVE (1984); ROBIN
SCROGGS, THE NEW TESTAMENT AND HOMOSEXUALITY (1983). As indicated by their respective dates
of publication, all of these texts were available at the time Bowers was being decided by the Supreme
Court.
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values, but because it employed them improperly through a combination
of incomplete historical and theological analysis. 7 '
B. The Establishment Clause Revisited
Although this Note is generally critical of positions which would
prohibit the judicial use of religious values by means of the Establishment
Clause,' 7 ' judges must nevertheless conform their actions to the
requirements of that clause as construed by the Supreme Court. For
Establishment Clause purposes, then, it may be necessary to discriminate
among different judicial uses of religious values. In particular, three
factors may be helpful in this process: (1) the nature of the religious
value, (2) the degree to which it informs the judge's decision making, and
(3) the manner in which it is employed by the judge. 7
Under the three-prong Lemon test,'73 for example, the particular nature
of the religious value may bear upon the first prong-namely, whether the
judge's purpose in using that value is predominantly secular or
religious.' 74 Likewise, the degree to which the judge relies on religious
values may relate to both the second and third prongs, measuring effect
and entanglement, respectively If, for instance, a judge substantially or
170. The same critique could probably also be applied to Justice Bradley's well-known statement in
Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concumng), that "[the paramount
destiny and mission of woman [sic] are to fulfil the noble and benign offices of wife and mother. This
is the law of the Creator." See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges
Avoid Serious Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1947-48 (1991); Kenneth L. Karst, Woman's
Constitution, 1984 DuKE L.J. 447, 450-51 (1984).
171. See supra notes 83-89 and accompanying text.
172. This three-factor analysis for discnminating among different uses under the Establishment
Clause is proposed only for Establishment Clause purposes. There may be other reasons why different
uses of religious values by government should be treated differently, but the analysis presented here
should be viewed solely as a means to bring this Note's thesis in line with current constitutional
doctrine. Incidentally, this three-factor analysis is roughly analogous to the Court's own analysis used
to measure effect (Lemon's second prong) m cases involving financial aid to religious educational
institutions. In such cases, the Court's decision making seems to turn on the educational level of the
students, the type of aid provided, and the manner in which the aid is provided. See, e.g., Mueller v.
Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 396-402 (1983) (upholding a Minnesota plan allowing taxpayers to deduct certain
expenses-e.g., tuition, textbooks, and transportation-incurred in providing for their children's primary
and secondary education, whether public, private nonparochial, or parochial).
173. See supra note 82 for a discussion of Lemon.
174. Cf Conlde, supra note 57, at 5-6 (distinguishing between "spiritual" and "worldly" religious
purposes). Based on this distinction, Professor Conkle argues that when a religious purpose is
spiritual--that is, when it is aimed at supporting spiritual activities such as prayer or proclamations of
faith-then, in general, government should avoid acting on that purpose. In contrast, when a religious
purpose is worldly-that is, when it is aimed at addressing concrete social problems such as poverty or
racial inequality-then in general government can act on that purpose. See id. at 8-10.
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wholly rests her opinion on a particular religious claim, then this would
likely have the effect of endorsing (and advancing) religion and may also
create an impermissible entanglement between government and religion.
And of course the manner in which the judge uses religious
values-whether she refers to them solely at the deliberative stage or
whether she actually includes them in her written or oral opinion-would
obviously relate to Lemon's second prong, measuring effect. Finally, the
judge who purposefully chooses to advert only to one or a select few
sources of religious input, particularly in the initial deliberative process,
will likely be favoring one religion over others, a form of government
action not permitted under current doctrine.1
7 5
In light of these doctrinal limitations, is it even possible for a judge to
advert to religious values in her decision-making process and not run
afoul of the First Amendment? To avoid religious favoritism, first of all,
judges can certainly attempt to be inclusive in their examination of
religious values and thus avoid arbitrary discrimination among available
religious traditions. An inclusiveness requirement should not mean that a
judge must advert to all available religious values, or that a judge who
ultimately relies on religious values must cite them all in her opinion.
Regarding certain issues, in fact, it may be that only a small number of
religious organizations have systematically set forth a body of principles
and positions to which a judge can refer.16 But judges should at least
175. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
176. To require a judge to investigate and evaluate all possible sources of religious insight is clearly
impractical and arguably unnecessary. First, not all religious traditions or values will be relevant to an
issue and, as noted in the text, not all religious traditions will have a concrete, systematic position to
which a judge can refer. Second and more important, the responsibility for developing and providing
judges with such bodies of doctrine should arguably rest with the religious community, not with the
judge. To be sure, a religious organization's willingness to provide such information to judges-for
example, in the form of amicus curiae briefs-will be a direct reflection of whether or not they
genuinely desire to participate in the law-making process. And whether or not a group will be granted
leave of court to file an amicus brief will in turn reflect the court's determination of whether or not that
group's input is relevant to resolving the case at hand. Cf., e.g., In re Karen Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (NJ.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976):
[W]e note the position of [the Roman Catholic] Church as illuminated by the record
before us. We have no reason to believe that [the plaintiff's claim for relief] would be at
all discordant with the whole of Judeo-Chnstian tradition, considering its central respect
and reverance for the sanctity of human life. It was in this sense of relevance that we
admitted as Amicus curiae the New Jersey Catholic Conference, essentially the
spokesman for the various Catholic bishops of New Jersey, organized to give witness to
spiritual values in public affairs in the statewide community.
Id. at 658.
At least one commentator, though, has proposed that judges should in fact have some affirmative
responsibility to solicit normative arguments from litigants, through those litigants' briefs, whenever
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attempt to be inclusive, especially at the deliberative stage, and those who
fail to do so may be rightly condemned under the First Amendment.
Regarding the first prong of Lemon (measuring purpose), here too the
risk of violating the Clause will rest largely with the judge's own
willingness to use religious values within constitutional guidelines. If the
judge's purpose in adverting to religious values is primarily to advance or
endorse religion, either in general or specifically over irreligion, then she
will almost certainly violate the Establishment Clause. But if instead she
adverts to religious values for the purpose of reaching a well-informed,
impartial decision-that is, one which takes account of all sources of
social, economic, political, and ethical input, including religious
insight' 7 7 -then this should suffice as a legitimate secular purpose and
the clause would not be violated.1
78
Regarding the second prong of Lemon (measuring effect), one must
examine two kinds of effect: actual advancement and perceived
endorsement. The first of these concerns-actual advancement-should not
be problematic. Although judicial use of religious values may in fact
advance religion, if done prudently, then any such advancement should not
be the primary effect as required under Lemon179, and no violation of
judges perceive that normative issues are going to be important in the resolution of a
given controversy. If implemented, it could bring a greater degree of truthfulness and
clarity into analysis of public policy questions, and result in both wiser and more just
resolution of many controversies before the courts. Proceeding in tls way, courts could
accomplish openly and more adequately what they have been doing covertly, uncon-
sciously, and often quite imperfectly.
Hiers, supra note 58, at 11.
177. In fact, because American society and its judicial system are heavily Judeo-Christian in
background, especially Protestant Chrstian, impartiality may only be possible when ajudge does survey
the landscape of religious thought and, when making her decision, takes account of this survey. To do
otherwise would be simply to allow, by default, the existing Judeo-Christian value system to take
precedence over any other competing religious or value systems.
178. But cf. Sanford Levmson, Religious Language and the Public Square, 105 HARv. L. REV. 2061,
2071 (1992) (reviewing PERRY, supra note 4) ("In light of existing Supreme Court precedent, it is
doubtful that a law motivated in fact by religious considerations could withstand Establishment Clause
scrutiny simply because it arguably furthers an articulable secular public purpose."). It should be noted
that the current significance of the purpose prong, like the significance of the Lemon test generally, is
somewhat in doubt. First, the more recent Supreme Court cases which have directly addressed this prong
suggest that, at most, the secular purpose need only be the primary purpose, and possibly that the secular
purpose need not even be primary. See, e.g., Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 57 (1985); TRIBE, supra
note 7, § 14-9. Second and more serious, the actual value of the secular purpose requrement, both in
theory and in application, is highly questionable. See, e.g., Myers, supra note 47, at 51-58; Hal
Culbertson, Note, Religion in the Political Process: A Critique of Lemon's Purpose Test, 1990 U. ILL.
L. REv. 915. At least one scholar, in fact, has persuasively argued that this requirement "serves no real
function, especially if the Court adopts its usual approach of construing 'secular' in broad terms."
Myers, supra note 47, at 57.
179. See supra note 82.
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the Clause should be found. 80 The second of these concerns, perceived
endorsement, may not be so easily satisfied and will largely depend on the
three factors discussed earlier as well as on the nature or sensitivity of the
relevant observer-that is, the one making the perception of endorsement.
If the judge, for example, relies heavily or solely on religious values in
her decision and if this reliance is clearly expressed in her written or oral
opinion, then this could be an impermissible endorsement, particularly
from the perspective of a sensitive observer who is nonreligious or whose
religious values either were not considered or were dismissed in the
judge's analysis. In contrast, if the judge merely acknowledges various
religious values in her deliberative process or if she includes in her
opinion religious values among numerous other factors, then it would be
more difficult to call this an endorsement within the meaning of the
Clause, especially from the vantage point of a less sensitive observer.
Of course, if a concern about endorsement leads judges simply to avoid
disclosing their use of religious values when it comes time to writing
opinions-a phenomenon which this Note argues is already
occurring"'-or simply to mix those values in among other sources of
input, then this may only underscore the absurdity of using endorsement
as the touchstone of establishment in the first place. To put it another
way, just as "[E]stablishment [C]lause analysis regarding a nativity scene
should not depend on whether a symbol is presented along with other
figures and decorations such as Santa Claus, reindeer, candy canes, and
clowns,"'8 2 Establishment Clause analysis regarding the judicial use of
religious values should ultimately not depend on whether those values are
hidden from the public's sight or flanked by a host of nonreligious
justifications.
Finally, the satisfaction of Lemon's third prong (measuring government-
religion entanglement) would be largely contingent on the judge's
willingness and ability to remain institutionally and administratively
detached from the religious sources which inform her decision
180. The Court's requirement that government may not take actions which have the primary effect
of advancing religion is of course foreign to the tone of this Note (particularly Part II.A-C), which
argues antithetically that the removal of religion from law making is undesirable and that religion should
in fact play a larger role in law making as a matter of tradition, political fairness, and social utility.
Accordingly, the Establishment Clause analysis undertaken here should not be perceived, by the
sensitive or insensitive observer, to be an endorsement of Lemon and its progeny.
181. See supra part II.D.
182. Shahm Rezai, Note, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos in Establishment
Clause Analysis, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 503, 528 n.183 (1990).
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making.8 3 A serious Establishment Clause concern would surely arise,
for instance, were a judge effectively to transfer some portion of her
judicial decision making capacity to an identifiable religious entity-by
regularly employing some kind of religious advisor, for example, or by
soliciting the doctrinal imprimatur of her religious institution. 8 4 Except
for these obvious illustrations, however, it seems unlikely that a judge's
use of religious values when deciding cases, without more, would amount
to the kind of excessive entanglement envisioned by current Establishment
Clause doctrine.
C. The Issue of Judicial Competence
One final concern raised by the prospect of judges using religious values
is the ever-present issue of judicial competence. As set forth in this Note,
a judge's proper use of religious values may require her to appreciate
religious philosophy-if not also history, comparative religion, and
ethics-at a level which she is not likely to possess."8 5 While the issue
of judicial competence may be troublesome, however, two factors suggest
that this concern, like the philosophical and constitutional concerns raised
earlier, should not alone preclude judges from adverting to religious
values when deciding hard cases.
First, it is equally true that judges may lack competence in historical
analysis or the social or physical sciences, and yet judges nevertheless
frequently employ or refer to these areas when deciding cases. What must
be important, then, is not the judge's competence in a particular area, but
rather whether that area is relevant to the case and is necessary to yield
a well-informed, well-reasoned decision. Second, judges are already
deciding disputes-certain Free Exercise Clause cases1 8 6 or child
183. See TRIuB, supra note 7, § 14-11.
184. Cf. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) ("Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups
and vice versa."'); Larkin v. Grendel's Den, Inc., 459 U.S. 116 (1982) (invalidating a state statute which
empowered churches and schools to veto liquor license applications for establishments within 500 feet
of church or school grounds). In addition to finding a primary effect of advancing religion, the Larkin
Court found the statute "offensive to the spirit of the Constitution" largely because it "enmeshe[d]
churches in the processes of government." Id. at 127.
185. See Garvey, supra note 78, at 805 ("I see little to suggest thatjudges are by background skilled
in the disciplines of systematic moral philosophy or theology and nothing in the processes of
adjudication is likely to bring forth this needed expertise. Furthermore, judicial decisions seldom indicate
that the courts have attempted a comprehensive moral analysis.").
186. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (involving a rather extensive judicial inquiry
into the nature of Old Order Amish religious beliefs and community); State v. Swartzentruber, 556
N.E.2d 531 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1989) (similarly involving an inquiry into the nature and reasoning of Old
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custody cases, 87 for example-which require serious inquiries into the
nature of religious beliefs and values, even though judicial competence
may be a legitimate concern. Indeed, from the empirical perspective
discussed earlier, 8 judges are inevitably employing religious values
even in cases which do not explicitly involve religion as such.
Therefore, while competence should always be a concern, a possible
lack of competence can hardly justify the exclusion of religious values
when they are relevant or helpful to the resolution of a case."89 In short,
judges should and will enter into their decision making all relevant
factors, and if religious values are one such relevant factor, then even
where competence is an issue, recourse to those religious values should
still occur as a matter of fundamental judicial responsibility
CONCLUSION
At a time when lawmakers are facing increasingly complex moral
questions, there ought to be great concern over how those questions are
addressed. Normally abstract inquiries-what it means to be a human
being, for example-are becoming concrete legal issues due to rapid
advances in technologies such as life-prolongation and genetic
engineering. Likewise, as the interrelatedness and fragility of the natural
world are increasingly appreciated, difficult ethical questions about the
human community's relationship to that world and to other species are
necessarily being raised. If judges and other lawmakers are to find
meaningful answers to these and other hard questions, they must
ultimately go beyond the empirical data and the scientific models and
engage in serious moral inquiry, invoking certain values at the expense of
others. 190
Order Amish religious beliefs).
187. See generally Donald L. Beschle, God Bless the Child?: The Use of Religion as a Factor in
Child Custody and Adoption Proceedings, 58 FORDHAM L. REv. 383 (1989); Note, The Establishment
Clause and Religion in Child Custody Disputes: Factoring Religion into the Best Interest Equation, 82
MICH. L. REv. 1702 (1984); Annotation, Religion as a Factor in Child Custody and Visitation Cases,
22 A.L.R4th 971 (1991).
188. See supra part II.D.
189. To some extent, this assertion begs the question since the relevance or helpfulness of religious
values in any particular case is in part contingent on the judge's own capacity to use those values in a
competent manner. As a result, there may be some point at which a lack of judicial competence might
actually outweigh the legal relevance of those religious values, such that their use would ultimately be
less, not more, helpful.
190. In this regard, the noted English jurist Lord Denning has remarked:
[I]f we seek truth and justice, we cannot find it by argument and debate, nor by reading
and thinking, but only by the maintenance of true religion and virtue. Religion concerns
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As one response to the challenge facing lawmakers, this Note advocates
the use of religious values as a legitimate, constructive, and even
necessary element of judicial decision making. Despite the possible
constitutional and philosophical concerns it raises, the inclusion of
religious values in the law-making process can be justified-as this Note
has attempted to do-by critically evaluating various assumptions about
religious knowledge and by reexamining the relationship between religion
and judicial law making from historical, constitutional, philosophical,
utilitarian, and empirical perspectives. From the empirical perspective, in
fact, the concern may not be one of justification, but rather of how
competently judges are in fact using religious values.
Ultimately, a debate about the role of religious values in judicial
decision making is necessarily part of the ongoing debate about the role
of religion in public life. That larger debate is complex and at times quite
heated, in no small measure because it asks core questions about who we
are as citizens and as a country-as individuals and as a community-and
about our competing normative visions of the law To some, perhaps, the
law should strive to be an arena of secular triumph; to others, the law
should seek to be a profane embodiment of divine will. To the judge,
however, the law must be a forum of justice, a precarious balance between
these normative visions, lest it will become fundamentally illegitimate.
Without such a balance the law will not work. Without justice, it will be
dead.
the spirit in man whereby he is able to recognise what is truth and what is justice;
whereas law is only the application, however imperfectly, of truth and justice in our
everyday affairs. If religion perishes in the land, truth and justice will also.
ALFRED T. DENNING, THE CHANGING LAW 122 (1953).
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